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 Abstract 
Government, non-government and donor organisations have developed a social assistance 
programme known as the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) which has two sub-
programmes, namely the Public Work Programme (PWP) and Direct Support Programme 
(DSP). PSNP is designed to reduce the vulnerability of poor people to drought. It targets 
households in most cases without considering ex ante the issue of intra-household resource 
distribution. This paper assesses, using Young Lives survey data, the impacts of PSNP and 
Agricultural Extension Programme (AEP) on time use between work and schooling, as well 
as the highest grade completed by 12-year-old children in rural and urban Ethiopia. 
Empirically the study used propensity score matching techniques to estimate the impact of 
PSNP and AEP on child welfare measured by time use in various types of work, schooling 
and studying. We found that PWP in rural areas increases child work for pay; reduces 
children’s time spent on child care, household chores and total hours spent on all kind of 
work combined; and increases girls spending on studying. The DSP in rural and urban areas 
reduces time children spent on paid and unpaid work, and increases the highest grade 
completed by boys in urban areas. On the other hand, AEP in rural areas was effective in 
reducing child work for pay and total work, increasing time girls spent on schooling and the 
highest grade completed by girls. 
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1. Introduction 
Child labour/work and its potential causes has become a major subject of study in the 
economic literature of the past decade. Theoretically, children’s time allocation between work 
and education is the result of household decisions shaped by the availability of assets, 
inputs, credit and insurance, the effectiveness of labour and credit markets, and parental 
education levels. They call this model a household production model (Becker and Tomes 
1976). Based upon this model, various hypotheses exist as to what causes the incidence and 
intensity of child labour in developing countries. The most frequently mentioned cause of 
child labour is poverty: raising parents’ income would mean that sending children to the 
labour market was no longer a necessity (Basu and Van 1998; López-Calva 2001). Without 
this income, parents use child labour to trade off higher current income against lower future 
child income as it reduces children’s human capital development.1 However, poverty isn’t the 
only factorleading to parents involving their children in work. It has to be associated with non-
positive bequests and financial market imperfections that prevent parents from trading-off 
old-age income with current resources, leading them to produce too much child labour 
relative to the first best optimum that would hold with positive bequests or perfect financial 
markets (Baland and Robinson 2000).  
Although the poverty hypothesis suggests that there could be a positive correlation between 
expenditure/wealth and child schooling, liquidity constraints and imperfect labour markets 
may result in the opposite relationship (Bhalotra and Heady 2003; Nielson 1998). Wealth 
paradox (Bhalotra and Heady 2003; Nielson 1998) states that in the absence of perfect 
access to credit and with the imperfect substitution of hired labour for family labour, livestock 
ownership and the cultivation of larger land holdings (or the use of more labour intensive 
technologies in the same land size) may in fact lead to greater demands for child labour than 
schooling (Coulombe 1998).  
Recent literature (Guarcello et al. 2003; Duryea et al. 2003; Beegle et al. 2006; Jacoby and 
Skoufias 1997; Jensen 2000) points out that child labour may vary depending on households’ 
ability to respond to unexpected income shocks. Households that lack formal credit and 
insurance markets can increase the intensity of child labour to buffer the effects of negative 
economic shocks, very much like they can with sales of assets, running down savings or 
using informal social networks of transfers and loans. Child labour allows households to 
partially offset income loss directly, through child wage income; or indirectly, by freeing up 
adult labour from household work or chores. According to this hypothesis, increases in child 
labour incidence and/or intensity should be associated with households that have 
experienced such negative economic shocks.  
To reduce the negative impact of economic shocks on children, government and non-
government organisations, including donor groups, develop social protection programmes, 
including social assistances like conditional and unconditional cash transfer to the poor 
(Farrington and Slater 2006). There are studies that evaluate whether such transfers achieve 
the stated objectives, especially for conditional cash transfer programmes (de Janvry et al. 
2006; Cardoso, Souza and Portela 2004). For example, de Janvry et al. assess the long-term 
effects of economic shocks on school attendance in Mexico and evaluate the effectiveness of 
the conditional cash transfer (CCT) programmes which are part of Mexico’s Progress 
 
 
1 This is known as poverty hypothesis in child labour/education literature.   
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programme. Using panel data from the Progresa (Mexican development program) 
experience with randomised treatment, they show that short-term shocks that take children 
out of school will have long-term consequences on their educational achievements. 
Idiosyncratic and covariate shocks pushed parents to take children out of school and to use 
child labour as a risk-coping strategy. Consequently they show that the Conditional Cash 
Transfer helps protect children from these shocks, creating an additional benefit in that these 
programmes are effective safety nets with long-term benefits. However, the effect of 
unconditional cash transfer or social assistance (one form of protection programme) on child 
welfare is not clearly known.  
A prime concern of governments and donor organisations in developing countries, including 
Ethiopia, is to mitigate poverty. To address extreme poverty, governments, in collaboration 
with donors and non-governmental organisations, are developing various social protection 
strategies. Among these, the Ethiopian government introduced a public work and direct 
support programme popularly known as the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) in 
2005 to strengthen the emergency relief-based Employment Generation Scheme (EGS) in 
order to better address poverty and vulnerability in both rural and urban Ethiopia.  
However, all of these social protection policies target the household as a whole, without 
focusing on the issue of intra-household resource distribution. In particular, the child welfare 
effect of social protection programmes is not considered by practitioners and policy-makers 
(at least for the programmes considered in this paper, namely PSNP, EGS and AEP). This is 
partly based on the assumption that child welfare will improve when household poverty is 
reduced. Social protection programmes, if carefully applied, may reduce household poverty, 
but it may be at the expense of child welfare. For example, provision of agricultural extension 
support may encourage households to buy fertiliser, livestock and other purchased inputs 
and capital in order to intensify farming. Moreover, while Public Work Programmes (PWP) 
increase household income and hence improve child welfare in terms of nutrition, they may 
also increase the demand for labour. If this demand cannot be met via adult family and hired 
labour, children may be subjected to heavy work both at home and outside home, which 
would compete with schooling and studying time. Therefore, unintentionally, the social 
protection programmes, which are originally designed to improve household welfare, can be 
damaging to children. Children, instead of going to school and/or using their free time for 
studying and entertainment, may be forced to spend their time engaged in activities aimed at 
short-term benefit, such as earning income from child labour.  
Ethiopia (as indicated in the recent poverty reduction strategy known as the Programme for 
Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty [PASDEP]) has intensified the use 
of public work, credit and agricultural extension support programmes in rural Ethiopia, and of 
micro- and small-scale enterprises in urban areas (MoFED 2006). As argued above, such 
polices may have detrimental effects on child welfare. The underlying assumption behind 
such programmes is that labour is relatively more abundant than capital, leading to the 
conclusion that new livelihood opportunities should be labour-intensive and agriculture-
based. However, given imperfect labour and credit markets, the demand for labour may in 
the short term be met by involving children in either paid or non-paid work.  
The public work and agricultural extension programmes implemented in rural Ethiopia require 
households to supply labour in order to obtain the payment. Hence, we expect public work 
(PSNP) and agricultural extension support programmes to have both substitution effect and 
income effect. The substitution effect arises because these programmes increase the 
demand for labour and may create an incentive to intensively use children’s time and/or 
substitute child time for adult time in household chores, child care and works outside home. 
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Because these support programmes bring additional resources to the households, they have 
income effects in the sense that participation in these programmes increases child schooling 
and reduces child work.  
The Direct Support Programme (DSP) component of the PSNP (cash/food and education 
support) has been implemented in both rural and urban areas. These programmes do not 
require households to supply labour to obtain the support. Hence we expect these 
programmes to have only income effect, not substitution effect. Therefore their effects on 
child labour and education would be expected to differ from that of public work and 
agricultural extension programmes. If the programmes are effective we expect involvement of 
households in cash/food aid and education support programmes to reduce child work and 
increase schooling and studying time.  
The hypothesis of this study, therefore, is that the provision of public work and agricultural 
extension support programmes via the promotion of labour-intensive activities, while 
augmenting aggregate economic development, could be detrimental to child well-being when 
pursued without precautionary management measures. In order to create a win-win situation 
where both national economic development and children’s rights (socioeconomic, civic and 
cultural) are realised, it is crucial to have a deep understanding of the relationship between 
support programmes and children’s time use.  
Although studies investigate the effect of support programmes on household welfare, those 
that examine the child welfare effect of support programmes that target households instead 
of children are scarce. In particular, the effectiveness of social assistance programmes 
designed to improve household income is not assessed well, at least in the Ethiopian and 
African context. This paper therefore tries to assess the impact of social protection 
programmes on child welfare measured by child work and education. Specifically, the 
objectives of this paper are: 
1 To investigate whether the participation of households in PWPs and agricultural 
extension programmes affects children’s time use between work on the one hand and 
schooling and study at home on the other hand.  
2 To gauge the effectiveness of direct support (cash and food aid) programmes in 
reducing child work and increase child schooling.  
3 To assess the differential impact of the support programmes on boys and girls.  
The study uses propensity score matching techniques in order to estimate the impact of 
support programmes. Data from the Young Lives survey for the older cohort sample collected 
in the last quarter of 2002 and 2006 was used for the study.   
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section two presents a brief literature review of 
concepts and empirical studies. Descriptions of the support programmes considered in the 
paper are presented in section three. Section four outlines the theoretical framework and 
method of estimating programme impacts as well as a description of the data used in the 
paper. Section four presents the results and discussion. The summary, conclusion and policy 
implications are highlighted in section six.    
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2. Literature review in brief  
Definition of  child labour. The literature differentiates between ‘child work’ and ‘child labour’. 
The first mainly refers to work which is not particularly harmful for the child and does not 
damage his or her educational opportunities. On the contrary, ‘child labour’ relates to work 
which is likely to damage children’s physical and psychological health and development, as 
well as their chances of fulfilling other rights, mainly the right to education.  
According to the International Labour Office (ILO), child labour has been defined as (a) all 
economic activities undertaken by children under age 11; (b) all economic activity undertaken 
by children aged 12 to 14, excluding permitted ‘light work’ in the sense of Convention 138; (c) 
all economic activity carried out under ‘hazardous conditions’ by children aged 15 to 17; and 
(d) ‘the worst forms of child labour’ carried out under age 18.  
The ILO’s definition of child labour does not include the activities performed by children inside 
the house (all forms of domestic work and family care) on the ground that these kinds of work 
do not harm children’s education, health and physical and psychological development. 
However, evidences show that these kinds of activities also contribute to harm children’s 
development and learning processes, especially in the case of girls (see Knaul 1999; Lavinas 
et al. 2001; Levinson et al. 2001; Sedlacek et al. 2001. Cited in Anker [2000]). 
In this paper, we use the terms child work and labour interchangeably because we do not 
want to engage in the controversy of including children’s activity at home in the definition of 
child labour. Furthermore, we found that it is difficult to apply ILO’s definition of child labour, 
as we are using data from children of 5 to 17 years old and the ILO definition requires a 
different intensity of child work for different age groups.   
Theoretical models of  child labour. The analysis of children’s time use between work and 
education is done by employing models of household behaviour. Modelling of household 
behaviour in mainstream economics started with Becker (1965) and is known in literature as 
the household production model (Becker and Tomes 1976). According to the review made by 
(Dar et al. 2002) there are two basic types of household model commonly used by 
economists: bargaining models and altruistic models. In bargaining models, household 
behaviour is the outcome of internal bargains and power struggles (Bourguignon and 
Chiapori 1994). Bargaining models may be of two distinct kinds, depending on who the 
agents involved in the bargaining process are. Intra-household bargaining models assume 
that bargaining occurs within the family between parents and the child/children. Solutions to 
these models usually specify that a child’s labour supply depends on the adult wages and 
child’s wage that prevail on the market. In the extra-household approach, it is assumed that 
children have negligible bargaining power in households, and are basically an instrument for 
the parents’ maximisation of utility. These models usually treat employers and parents of the 
children as the two main factors involved in the bargaining process (Dar et al. 2002). 
These models contrast sharply with altruist models of child labour, in which the parents are 
altruistically concerned with the child’s welfare. Furthermore, the altruistic classes of model 
are differentiated from bargaining models, as they assume multiple equilibria (Dar et al. 
2002). Foremost among the altruistic models is that presented in Basu and Van (1998), 
which provides a framework for investigating how child labour and adult labour are 
interdependent in economic activity and under what conditions child labour emerges in the 
labour market. The main findings in their paper are essentially derived from two axioms 
referred to as the ‘luxury’ and ‘substitution’ axioms, respectively. The luxury axiom states that 
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a family sends the children to the labour market only if the family’s income from non-child 
labour sources drops below the subsistence level; and substitution axiom asserts that child 
labour and adult labour are substitutes from a firm’s point of view (Dar et al. 2002).   
Basu and Van (1998), in a multiple equilibria model, stress an alternative mechanism in 
which child labour is both a cause and a consequence of poverty: in a ‘good’ equilibrium, 
when market wages are high, parents choose not to send their children to work; whereas in a 
‘bad’ equilibrium, when wages are low and families are poor, parents send their children into 
the labour force (Kruger et al. 2007). Dessy (2000) finds that there is a critical level of adult 
wages below which child labour is supplied. Ranjan (2001) also shows that credit constraints 
lead to inefficiently high levels of child labour, which, in turn, are related to greater income 
inequality. 
Other models exploring multiple equilibria have looked at the relationship between child 
labour and social norms, and also at the question of income redistribution. The redistribution 
question is examined by Swinnerton and Rogers (1999), who stated  that while the two 
crucial assumptions implied by Basu and Van’s ‘luxury’ and ‘substitution’ axioms are related 
to the micro-behaviour of households and firms, in addition there also exists an essential 
assumption linked to the macro-behaviour. They describe a ‘distribution axiom’, which states 
that income and/or wealth from non-labour sources must be sufficiently concentrated within 
only a few agents to generate child labour. In particular, Swinnerton and Rogers demonstrate 
that with sufficient equality in the distribution of non-labour income, market equilibrium with 
child labour cannot exist in the Basu and Van model. This observation highlights the 
importance of inequality and/or bargaining power at the macro as well as the individual level 
as a potential important determinant of child labour (Dar et al. 2002).  
Within the class of altruistic household model, Baland and Robinson (2000) have looked at 
dynamic consequences of child labour. They demonstrate various channels through which 
inefficiently high levels of child labour may persist in equilibrium, even when parents are 
altruistic. First, lack of access to credit markets may force parents to let their children engage 
in child labour to an extent that is Pareto inferior to what they would have chosen with 
sufficient access to credit. Second, since children cannot write credible and enforceable 
contracts for their parents to transfer resources to them in the future, this too may generate 
an inefficient level of child labour in equilibrium. Parents are unable to capture the full returns 
from their investment in children’s education and therefore will under-invest, relative to what 
would otherwise be (Pareto) optimal.   
Concept of  social protection. Social protection is becoming a broader concept which goes 
beyond social policies and social welfare. According to Farrington and Slater (2006), social 
protection encompasses a sub-set of public actions that address risk, vulnerability and 
chronic poverty. Meanwhile, the World Bank describes a social protection programme with 
social risk management, and goes beyond the traditional area of social protection (labour 
market interventions, social insurance and social safety nets) to redefine its strategies to deal 
with risk (Holzmann and Jorgensen 2000). The three strategies of the World Bank’s Social 
Risk Management are prevention, mitigation and coping, which can be provided via informal 
mechanisms (storing in the form wealth, trees, and transfer of cash within the household), 
market-based (insurance) and publicly mandated (such as social insurance, transferred 
payment of various kinds and public work). Canway and Norton (2002) argue that social 
protection includes the link between social assistance and wider economic objectives, such 
as growth, by assisting the poor so as to make them contribute towards growth, which closely 
resembles the World Bank’s social risk management. The idea is to link social protection with 
the productive sector by making the market work better for the poor. As a result, provision of 
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credit and subsidised or free input are considered as components of social protection 
(Farrington, Slater and Holmes 2004). The UNICEF view of social protection focuses on 
vulnerable group such children and views social protection as a basic human right, in that the 
government are under obligation to provide both economic and social support to the most 
vulnerable segment of the population (Kamerman and Gabel 2006). The most inclusive 
definition is that developed by Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler (2004), which goes beyond 
raising income and reducing poverty. They state that social protection must enhance the 
social equity and social rights of poor, vulnerable and marginalised populations:  
Social protection is the set of all initiatives, both formal and informal that provide: social 
assistance to extremely poor individuals and households; social services to groups who 
need special care or would otherwise be denied access to basic services; social 
insurance to protect people against the risks and consequences of livelihood shocks; 
and social equity to protect people against social risks such as discrimination or abuse. 
(Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2004) 
In general, there exists a broad range of social protection programmes. One form of social 
protection is social assistance which involves non-contributory transfers to those deemed 
eligible by society on the basis of their vulnerability or poverty (Farrington and Slater 2006). It 
includes food transfers (food stamps, food rations, food price subsidies), cash transfers 
(grants, non-contributory pensions, family allowance programmes), service subsidies (social 
housing programmes, utility subsidies and childcare centres), and conditional cash transfers 
(conditional on child and maternal health care practices, school attendance, and nutritional 
standards, or on the use of welfare programmes). Social assistance may also include 
livelihood support payments targeted at households below the poverty line, which they are 
free to spend as they wish; ‘cash for work’-type payments, i.e. made to those belonging to 
targeted categories who carry out public works under supervision; ‘matching funds’ which 
supplement the contributions that people themselves make to, for example, savings 
schemes, health and life insurance, and so on; and payments made as part of emergency 
relief, or to facilitate post-emergency transitions.  
Another form of social protection is social insurance which involves individuals pooling 
resources by paying contributions to the state or a private provider so that, if they suffer a 
shock or a permanent change in their circumstances, they are able to receive financial 
support. Social insurance is, in general, more appropriate for better-off individuals, although it 
can have an important role in preventing them from dropping into poverty (Farrington and 
Slater 2006).   
This paper follows the concept of social protection as defined by Devereux and Sabates-
Wheeler (2004) because it is broader, inclusive of all providers of social protection (formal 
and informal) and all dimensions of poverty including all initiatives that helps protect the rights 
of children. Although social protection encompasses both public and private initiatives that 
addresses household vulnerability to shocks, what we consider in this paper is social 
assistance programmes provided by government and non-governmental organisations, 
namely safety net programmes (public work and cash/food aid) designed to help poor, 
vulnerable and drought stricken people and agricultural extension support programme 
designed for farmers to get subsidised inputs, credit and market information.  
Social protection and its relation with child work and education. There is sufficient evidence 
that conditional cash transfer programmes help households to send their children school and 
to some extent reduce child labour (Tabatabai 2006; Rawlings 2005), while evidence on the 
effectiveness of unconditional cash transfers on child schooling is weak. Adapting a model 
PRODUCTIVE SAFETY NET PROGRAMME AND CHILDREN’S TIME USE BETWEEN  
WORK AND SCHOOLING IN ETHIOPIA 
 7 
proposed by Hyslop (1999) that represents labour market participation decisions when there 
are search costs, de Janvry et al. (2006) develop a simple dynamic model of school 
enrolment decision under uncertainty, in which re-entry to school after a period of absence 
requires additional effort and cost on the part of the student. This model generates an 
enrolment decision that depends on the past enrolment state and current level of human 
capital. Using panel data for villages from the Mexican Progresa programme with randomised 
treatment, they have shown that shocks are highly prevalent, that many children have 
irregular periods of school enrolment, and that child labour is very frequent. They also 
showed that there is strong state dependence in the enrolment decision. In other words, 
children taken out of school are less likely to return subsequently, implying long-term 
consequences from short-term decisions. 
From observing control villages incorporated in the treatment, de Janvry et al. (2006) note 
that children that who do not benefit from transfers during the experiment are harder to bring 
back to school, implying as well that short-term actions are difficult to reverse. Shocks have 
strong effects in taking children out of school. This applies to unemployment of the household 
head, illness of the household head and natural disasters in the community. In poor rural 
communities, children are indeed used as risk-coping instruments in response to these 
shocks. Strong state dependence implies that short-run consumption smoothing gains for the 
household result in long-term losses in human capital for children. The Progresa transfers, 
however, largely or completely compensate for these shocks. CCT thus have an important 
safety net role to play, protecting child education from a range of idiosyncratic and covariate 
shocks. Shocks also induce children to work, particularly girls and children of farm workers 
when their parents are affected by unemployment. Progresa transfers also fully shelter them 
from being sent to work. The conditionality on school attendance is thus effective in 
preventing use of their time as a risk-coping instrument. 
Dubois et al. (2003) study the effects of a conditional transfer programme on school enrolment 
and performance using the Mexican social programme Progresa. They estimate empirically 
the different incentive effects and average treatment effects on enrolment and performance at 
school and find that Progresa always had a positive impact on school continuation whereas for 
performance it had a positive impact at primary school but negative at secondary school, due 
to the programme termination after the third year of secondary school.  
Applying propensity score matching methods to household-level data from the 2000 Census 
of Brazil, Cardoso and Souza (2004) estimate the impact of income transfers on child labour 
and school attendance. They find that income transfer programmes have no significant effect 
on child labour, but do have a positive and significant impact on school attendance. This 
implies that the programmes are not effective in fighting child labour in Brazil because of the 
preference for combining school and labour, and that the transfers are considered too small 
to provide an incentive to forgo the labour income (Cardoso and Souza 2004).  
Attanasio et al. (2006) studied the effects of a conditional cash transfer programme 
implemented in rural areas in Colombia in 2002 (Familias en Acción), on school enrolment 
and child labour. Using a quasi-experimental approach, their results show that the programme 
increased school participation of 14- to 17-year-old children quite substantially, by between 5 
and 7 percentage points, and had lower, but not negligible, effects on the enrolment of 
younger children of between around 1.5 and 2.5 percentage points. In terms of work, the 
effects are generally largest for younger children, whose participation in domestic work 
decreased by around 10 to 12 percentage points after the programme but whose participation 
in income-generating work remained largely unaffected by the programme. The authors also 
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found evidence of school and work time not being fully substitutable, suggesting that some, 
but not all, of the increased time at school may be drawn from children’s leisure time. 
Schady and Araujo (2006) used a randomised study design to analyse the impact of the 
Bono de Desarrollo Humano, a cash transfer programme, on enrolment and child work 
among poor children in Ecuador. The objective was to determine whether or not programme 
effects are larger when transfers are ‘conditioned’ on certain behaviours, such as a 
requirement that households enrol their children in school. The authors found out that the 
cash transfer programme had a large, positive impact on school enrolment - about 10 
percentage points - and a large, negative impact on child work - about 17 percentage points. 
The fact that some households believed that there was a school enrolment requirement 
attached to the transfers, even though such a requirement was never enforced or monitored 
in Ecuador, helps explain the magnitude of programme effects. 
The study conducted by Edmonds (2006) found out that an anticipated large cash transfer to 
the elderly in South Africa appears to be associated with increases in schooling and declines 
in hours worked. The average rural South African child living with an elder who is not yet 
pension-eligible spends almost 3 hour per day working. In the data, pension income to an 
elder male is associated with over an hour less work per day. These declines in hours 
worked occur simultaneously with increases in school attendance. In turn, these declines in 
time spent working and increases in school attendance are also associated with increasing 
schooling attainment and primary school completion rates, especially for boys, in the length 
of time that the child has lived with a pension-eligible male. These changes in hours worked 
and schooling in relation to male pension eligibility lead to levels of work and schooling that 
are similar to what the data report for nearly-eligible elder women. Hence, the results herein 
would follow from a model where men are credit-constrained to a greater degree than are 
women. There is some suggestive evidence that these credit constraints influence schooling 
because of an inability to afford schooling.   
Baland and Robinson (2000) show that if a family faces liquidity constraints, then child labour 
is inefficiently high (from the family’s perspective), because child labour supply is determined 
by the marginal utility of consumption rather than the relative return to educational 
investments. The inability to borrow against future income forces households to under-invest 
in education. Therefore, receiving large cash transfers weaken this cash constraint, and 
hence children work less and attend school more. 
Cash transfers may enable households to make previously unattainable investments in 
income generating activities. Gertler et al. (2004) used a controlled randomised experiment 
to identify the extent to which beneficiary households from Mexico’s OPORTUNIDADES 
programme (an education, health and nutrition support programme), invested cash transfers 
and the extent to which those investments increased long-term household consumption. 
They found that transfers from the programme result in increased investments in micro-
enterprises and agricultural production, which have a lasting effect on the household’s ability 
to generate income and thereby increase living standards. 
Yap, Sedlacek and Orazem (2002) evaluated the impact of a programme in Brazil known as the 
Programmea de Erradicacao do Trabalho Infantil (PETI) which was implemented in poor 
rural states of Northeast Brazil in 1996. The PETI provided income transfers to poor 
households in exchange for an agreement that the child would attend school at least 80 per 
cent of the time. In addition, the child had to attend an after-school programme that 
effectively doubled the length of the school day. The study used experimental approach on a 
cross-section of 3564 households with 6772 children between ages 7-14. It assessed the 
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impact PETI had on child schooling, labour supply, academic performance and hazardous 
work. The treatment group was composed of three municipalities which were in the PETI 
programme. The control group included three municipalities of like socioeconomic status that 
were not in the PETI programme. The study found that PETI increased time spent at school, 
reduced labour force participation and hazardous work, and increased academic success for 
children who had participated in the programme.  
This review of literature reveals that while cash transfers conditional on children school 
attendance are effective in ensuring child schooling and reducing child work/labour, the 
evidence for the child welfare effect (schooling and labour) of unconditional assistance 
programmes such as public employment and food aid is not yet sufficiently available. 
Moreover, many of the studies that assessed the impact of conditional cash transfers on 
child welfare, especially on child labour, are conducted in Latin American and Caribbean 
countries where child labour is less extensive than in Africa (Tabatabai 2006). Therefore, 
this paper contributes towards filling the information gap on the relationship between child 
welfare (measured by education and work) and social assistance programmes that target 
households only. 
3. Description of employment 
support programmes  
The Food for Work programme in Ethiopia started in 1980 under the agenda of 
Rehabilitation and Development of Rural Lands and Infrastructure. The programme is 
divided into several phases. The first and the second were implanted from 1980 to 1994, 
while the third phase was conducted from 1995 to 1998 and the forth from 1999 to 2003. In 
1997, similar programmes - namely the EGS -started as temporary employment schemes 
designed to combine relief efforts with development activities. EGS was considered as a 
direct contribution to the rebuilding of household assets, contributing to reduce Ethiopia’s 
chronic food insecurity. This programme passed through three phases. The first phase (May 
1997 to December 1998) was a pilot programme conducted in two drought-prone areas in 
Amhara Regional State, Belesa Woreda and Tigray Regional State, Saesi Tsaeda Emba 
Woreda. In this programme, part of the relief effort is given to conducting development 
activities in the area such as soil and water conservation, rural road building and other 
efforts that build community assets. Those who are not able to work are given free food aid, 
but those who are able to work are given 2.5 kg of grain per working day.2 The second and 
third phases started in September 2001 and ran up until the launching of the PSNP in 2005.  
Gratuitous relief (GR) distribution and General Free Food Distribution (GFFD) were other 
programmes (before PSNP) designed to support people who are not able to work, including 
pregnant, lactating mothers, disabled people and children. The principle was that GR 
distribution should not be given to those able to work in order to discourage dependency. If 
a person is able to work, he has to participate in EGS in order to get food aid. If, however, 
there are no available projects that can be undertaken through EGS and the area is affected 
by a sudden onset disaster, free food can be distributed to those able to work temporarily 
 
 
2 The original plan was to provide 3 kg of grain per person, but because there is a shortage of relief resources, beneficiaries 
actually obtain 2.5 kg of grain per person.  
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until an EGS is implemented. This type of food aid is known as General Free Food 
Distribution (GFFD).3  
Geographical and household level targets were used to select the beneficiaries of the above-
mentioned PWPs (EGS and FFW). First geographical areas that are drought prone (sites) 
are selected. Then from each site, households are selected using vulnerability-ranking 
criteria, such as household assets and level of poverty. According to the National Food Aid 
Targeting Guidelines (DPPC 2000), the household level targeting criteria for FFW and EGS 
programmes were of two types, namely self-targeting and individual-targeting. Cash or in-
kind payment below the market wage rate was made to participants in the programme. 
Everybody living in the village was able to join the programme providing there were sufficient 
resources. If there were not sufficient resources for all participants, individual level targeting 
was applied. The major individual criteria for inclusion in the EGS and FFW were ownership 
of productive (land, and livestock holding) and personal assets (such as jewellery and food 
stock), production failure, level of income from non-agricultural activities, family size and 
number of dependents.  
After the severe droughts of 2002/03 (which brought extreme hunger upon almost one-
quarter of the population), it became clear that a well-planned EGS with more resources was 
needed to make people's livelihoods more secure, in case disaster struck again. As a result 
of successive discussions between donors and government bodies, the PSNP was launched 
by the Ethiopian Government in 2005 and backed by donors including DFID, the World Bank, 
Ireland, Canada, Sweden and the USA.  The PSNP has two components: the PWP and 
DSP. The PWP was planned to provide public works which are labour intensive community-
based activities designed in order to provide employment for chronically food-insecure 
people who have ‘able-bodied’ labour. The programme pays daily wages for unskilled labour 
(either in cash or in kind) for the able-bodied, chronically food-insecure beneficiaries of the 
Safety Net. People get money and food in exchange for work which focuses on improving 
public facilities, such as roads, water points, and health and education posts. With the money 
received, those who are most susceptible to food shortages can buy assets that may turn 
into lasting sources of income. By providing enough food to meet participants' needs, the 
programme is expected to make households less likely to resort to desperate measures 
when famine threatens.  
According to the revised PSNP programme implementation manual (FDRE 2006), a 
combination of administrative and community targeting is used to identify able-bodied food-
insecure households who can participate in the programme. The Food Security Task Force 
established in each community is responsible for selecting the beneficiaries (households) of 
the programme. In principle, the task force pre-identifies beneficiaries (MoARD 2006: 23) 
who (1) are chronically food-insecure;4 (2) who have suddenly become more food-insecure 
over the last 1 to 2 years as a result of a severe loss of assets and are unable to support 
themselves; and (3) who do not have any family support or other means of social protection 
or support. The task force has to further refine the selection by looking at (1) status of 
household assets such as land holding, quality of land and food stock; (2) income from non-
 
 
3 GFFD requires special authorisation whereby the district/Woreda Disaster and Preparedness Committee (WDPPC) raises the 
idea and RDPPC approves. The emergency operation was provided by WFP, EU and other non-governmental organisations, 
such as SCUK. 
4 Defined as households which have faced continuous food shortages in the last 3 years and have received food assistance 
prior to the commencement of the PSNP programme. 
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agricultural activities and alternative employment; and (3) support/remittances from relatives 
or community. According to a baseline line survey of the Ethiopian food security programme 
(Gilligan et. al. 2007), the actual selection criteria used by communities is not fully consistent 
with the guidelines. For example, beneficiary selection criteria used in Tigray, Amahara, 
Oromia and SNNP in 2006 were based on poverty, ownership of a small area of land and 
small number of livestock holdings and poor health. In these regions, nearly 78 per cent of 
the communities put poverty in the top five eligibility criteria for public work. Contrary to the 
guideline, household food insecurity is used only by 7 per cent of the communities because 
(1) it was found difficult to judge the food insecurity of households and (2) poverty is 
considered a good proxy for food insecurity. Moreover, about 12-17 per cent of the 
communities used disability as a criteria for eligibility for public work in Tigray, Oromia and 
SNNP regions, while people with a disability should have been covered by DSP.   
The PSNP programme also has a Direct Support (DSP) component which delivers 
assistance to households who are labour-poor and do not have reliable support. Specifically, 
the Direct Support component targets only two groups of individuals: the first group is 
individuals who (1) do not have labour to participate in public works; (2) do not have sufficient 
and reliable support from sons/daughters, or remittances from relatives away from the 
village; and (3) cannot participate or contribute to other community-based activities/initiatives, 
which includes disabled people. The second group includes individuals who do not have 
labour to participate in public works, but can participate or contribute in other community 
activities (e.g. managing day-care facilities). Such individuals include lactating mothers (in the 
first ten months after birth), pregnant women and orphaned teenagers. The actual main 
eligibility criteria used by the community for DSP in 2006 were age and disability in Tigray, 
Amhara, Oromia and SNNP (Gilligan et. al. 2007).  
Basically, the PSNP and Food and Cash for Work are similar in nature in that beneficiaries 
have to provide labour in order to get support in cash or in kind. The only difference between 
the previous (EGS) and the current (PSNP) is in resource availability, institutional 
arrangement and planning. While EGS is based on the resources obtained from the annual 
emergency relief aid, PSNP is based on external resources provided on a multi-annual basis 
through the Safety Net Budget line of the government. This ensures availability of resources 
from the start of the year and allows public works to be undertaken at the most appropriate 
time. The capital input and administrative costs were very limited for EGS while, in the case 
of PSNP, districts are given appropriate budgets for capital inputs into public works and other 
supporting activities, which improve the quality of public work, assets created and, where 
appropriate, allow for more technically complex projects. In the Safety Net Programme, 
PWPs are overseen by the Food Security line offices and are designed in line with districts’ 
development plans. On the other hand, there was no clear institutional responsibility to plan 
and follow up EGS activities. Therefore, we expect PSNP to be more effective than EGS in 
protecting households from shocks and falling into poverty as it has more resources, better 
planning and an institutional setup for implementation and monitoring.  
All Young Lives sample sites are located within the food security districts and hence all our 
sites are beneficiaries of PSNP, EGS or GFFD. The PSNP started in 2005. Our Young Lives 
survey captured involvement of households in the PSNP and the amount of income 
beneficiary households obtained in the 12 months prior to the survey. Since we have asked 
households about their involvement in Food and Cash for Work as well as other support 
programmes since 2002 via our programme support module, we were able to assess not 
only the impact of the PSNP, but also the other programmes that existed under the EGSs 
and agricultural extension programme.  
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In addition to the PSNP and EGS, farmers in rural areas receive agricultural extension 
support programmes which enable farmers to obtain technical advice on the use of modern 
cultural practices (such as ploughing, drainage, weeding and harvesting); access better 
marketing information and outlets; purchase capital inputs (such as fertiliser and improved 
seeds); and to use credit to purchase farm inputs and livestock for animal husbandry. The 
agricultural extension support programme has been in place since the Imperial Era, and went 
through successive reforms during the Derg and post Derg Regime. In 1995/6, the 
Participatory Demonstration and Training Extension System (PADETES) started to remedy 
the drawback of the previous systems. According to the review made by Kassa (2008), the 
stated objectives of the this new agricultural extension system are increasing the supply of 
food, industrial crops (i.e., those which can be used as raw materials for manufacturing such 
as cotton, and oil) and export crops, improving productivity and income, ensuring 
rehabilitation and conservation of natural resources base, and empowering farmers. To 
achieve these objectives the extension system used a package approach including 
distribution of farm input to farmers on credit. In short, the main three elements of PADETES 
are providing package of technologies, complementing the delivery of the packages by credit, 
and sufficient communication between actors in the extension system to ensure participation 
of beneficiaries.  
Although initially the programme focused on food crops, it later implemented a package of 
technologies for high value crops (oil crops and vegetables), livestock (dairy poultry, 
beekeeping and fattening) and natural resources (forestry, and soil and water conservation). 
As a result, credit availability improved, as did distribution of fertiliser, and improved varieties 
of crops and livestock were developed (Kassa 2008). Recently, the extension system was 
linked to food security in certain regions (for example, in Amhara and Tigray regions) in order 
to provide subsidised credit via microfinance for the purchase of farm inputs such as fertiliser, 
improved seeds and oxen and other farming activities such as fattening,  bee keeping, and 
water pumps (Borchgrevink et al. 2005).  
All farmers are free to take part in this programme. Even farmers who do not own land may 
participate in livestock programmes such as fattening, beekeeping and poultry. The main 
occupation of the Young Lives sample households in rural areas is farming, and hence all 
sample households are free to be beneficiaries of the agricultural extension support 
programme.  
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4. Theoretical framework, 
method of estimating impact 
and data set description   
4.1. Theoretical framework 
Households’ participation in EGS may affect the time children spend on working, schooling 
and study as a result of substitution and income effects. Employment generation 
programmes may reduce or increase child work (and the time children spent on schooling 
and study) depending on whether substitution effect dominates the income effect. The 
relative strength of substitution and income effects depends on the preference of households 
(indifference curve) for other good and schooling given their budget constraints; the 
opportunity cost of children and other household members’ time; and substitutability of adult 
labour by child labour or vice versa. If substitution effect dominates the income effect, 
involvement in EGS will increase child work and reduce schooling (including study time). If 
the income effect is large enough to be dominated by the substitution effect, EGS will reduce 
child work and increase the time for schooling and study.  
To see how the income and  substitution effects of EGS operates, let us consider Figure 1 
and Figure 2, with the vertical axis representing the quantity of other goods (denoted by X) 
available for consumption in the household and the horizontal axis representing time spent 
on schooling, study and leisure (S). Assume that M is the total amount of budget available to 
the household for spending on X and S given by  
Px X + PsS = M  
where Px is the price of other goods and Ps is the cost of children’s time, including direct cost 
of schooling, and Ps/Px the slope of the line. The total time available to children is line OT 
which can be used for working (W) and schooling, study and leisure (S). Child work is 








At a point where S=T, the child devotes his full time to schooling (including studying at 
home). When a child spends his time both working and schooling, the household faces a 
budget line with a negative slope representing children’s wage which equals Ps/Px indicating 
a trade-off between consumption of other goods and schooling (or work). The initial optimal 
allocation of children’s time between work and schooling will be determined by the tangency 
of the indifference curve and budget line, that is, at point A, where OS1 units of time are 
allocated to schooling and studying and TL1 units of time are allocated to work.  
To demonstrate a case where income effect dominates the substitution effect, let us consider 
Figure 1. Initially the household is at point A, where the indifference curve is tangent to the 
budget line. When a household participates in EGS, the budget available to the household 
increases from M to M’. Assuming the opportunity cost of time does not change, the 
equilibrium point moves from point A to point B, where child work declines from TL1 to 
TL2.and schooling time increases from OL1 to OL2 due to income effect. However, the 
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household faces a steeper budget line (line M’P), indicating an increase in the opportunity 
cost of using child time for schooling. As a result, the final optimal allocation of a child’s time 
is at point C, where child work increases to TL3 and schooling time decreases to OS1 due to 
substitution effect. Since the income effect dominates the substitution effect, child work 
declines from TL1 to TL3 and schooling time increases from OS1 to OS2.  
Figure 1. Effects of  EGS on child work and schooling time (income effect dominates 
substitution effect) 
 
Another scenario is a case where substitution effect dominates income effect (Figure 2). 
Assuming the household budget constraint before participation in EGS is line MN, the initial 
equilibrium will be at point A, where the indifference curve is tangent to the budget line. When 
a household is involved in EGS, the household’s budget constraint tilts upward and the new 
budget constraint is line PP’. Following the same argument as above, due to income effect, 
child work declines from OL1 to OL2, and schooling increases from OS1 to OS2. Due to the 
substitution effect, child work increases from OL2 to OL3, and schooling time declines from 
OS2 to OS3. Since the substitution effect dominates the income effect, the net effect is that 
child work increases from OL1 to OL3, and schooling time declines from OS1 to OS3 at the 
final optimal point, C. 
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Figure 2. Effect of  employment generation programmes on child work and schooling 
time (substitution effect outweighs income effect) Point D shows the level of  
transfer required for households to voluntarily allocate child’s full time to 
schooling and studying.  
 
4.2. Estimating the impact of EGS on child work and schooling and 
study time  
 
One possible way to measure the impact of safety nets on child welfare is to compare child 
welfare outcome (measured by child work) between those households which participate in 
EGS and those which do not. Let y1 denote the child labour outcome with treatment and y0 
the child labour outcome without treatment. Let the variable w be a binary treatment 
(participation in safety net programmes) indicator where w=1 denotes participation in the 
programmes and w=0 denotes non-participation.  
Let us assume that treatment w, is independent of the outcomes (y0 and y1) after conditioning 
with x: y1,y 0?w | x . We can also deal with the weaker version of conditional independence 
of participation and y0:   y 0?D | x . This assumption is called ignorability assumption (Rubin 
1978; Wooldridge 2001).  
Assuming that E(y | x,w )  is linear, the outcome-participation equation is given by  
  y = ? x +?w + u ,       (4.1) 
where   E[u | w ] = E[y ? ? x ??w | w ] = 0 . In this case w is treated as exogenous. In 
order to identify some population measure of impact, overlap or matching assumption is 
required. Matching assumption is stated as  
  0 < Pr[w = 1| x ] < 1)        (4.2) 
This assumption ensures that for each treated individual, there is another matched untreated 
individual with a similar x. When treatment participation depends stochastically on a vector of 
observables x, the concept of propensity score is useful. Propensity score is a conditional 
probability measure of treatment participation given x, denoted as  
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p(x) = Pr[w = 1| X = x ]       (4.3) 
Another condition that plays an important role in treatment evaluation is the balancing 
condition which states that   w?x | p(x) . This means that for individuals with the same 
propensity score, the assignment of treatment is random and should look identical in terms of 
x vector. This balancing condition is a testable hypothesis. Conditional mean independent 
assumption states that  
   E(y 0 | w = 1,x) =E(y 0 | w = 0,x) = E(y 0 | x).   
This implies that y0 does not determine participation. According to Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983), the conditional independent assumption given x implies conditional independent 
assumption given p(x). That is 
  y1,y 0?w | x ? y1,y 0?w | p(x) . 
Often p(x) is a particular function of x and is computed given the data (wi,xi) by logit or probit 
regression.  
From the assumptions above, the outcome-participation equation can be written as  
y = x© ? +?p(x) + u = ? x +?  p (x) + [u + ?(p(x) ?  p (x))]  (4.4) 
Since the unknown p(x) is replaced by a sample estimate, the error term, 
  u + ?(p(x) ?
 
p (x)), includes additional sampling error,   ?(p(x) ?
 
p (x)).  
Selection bias can arise when the treatment is correlated with the error term in the outcome 
equation. Selection bias can arise due to two reasons: selection on observables and 
selection on unobservables. Selection on observables arises when there are incorrectly 
omitted variables that partly determine w and y. In this case, the error term will be correlated 
with the participation variable, w. This can be easily corrected by including all relevant 
variables in the outcome equation. The second source of selection (selection on 
unobservables) arises when there are unobservable factors that partly determine both w and 
y, which makes the error term in the outcome equation to be correlated with the participation 
variable, w. In this case we have to deal with endogenous treatment effect or use IV 
estimation method.  
4.3. Description of data  
This paper uses Young Lives survey data from the older cohort, using a time-use module for 
the index children (12 years old). Specifically we used information collected using section 1A 
(page 3) and 1B (page 13) of the ‘Child Questionnaire’ of the older cohort. The outcome 
variables are hours spent on various activities in a typical day and the highest grade 
completed by the children. The activities include paid work outside home, unpaid work 
outside home, child care and household chores, schooling and studying at home. For the 
economic shock variables, we use data obtained via question 6.3 (question 6.3.5). 
Information regarding households’ involvement in social assistance programmes is obtained 
from question 3.17 of the household questionnaire, while information regarding household 
income from (and also involvement in) PSNP (PWP and DSP) is obtained from the income 
module (Section 3D, p. 39 and Section 3E, p. 43, respectively).  
Location and gender. The total number of observations used in this paper is of 980 
households, of which 584 (60 per cent) reside in rural areas while 396 (40 per cent) are 
urban dwellers. Overall, 51 per cent of the children are boys while the remaining 49 are girls. 
The average age of household heads (76 per cent of whom are male) is 43, with a range of 
15 to 85 years of age. The average mothers’ education level is grade two during both rounds 
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of the survey, while that of fathers is grade two in the first round and grade four during the 
second round (see Table A4.1 in the appendix).  
Household composition. The descriptive statistics in Tables A4.1 document a wide range of 
household compositions that include the number of household members disaggregated by 
age and sex, the birth order of index children, and the number of economically-dependent 
household members. The Young Lives older cohort sample children are on average the 
fourth children of their families, having an average of three older siblings. Each household 
also has at least 1.2 economically dependent members, with some households having up to 
five. An average household has a fairly similar number of male and female members (1.2 and 
1.3 respectively, on average) whose age range qualifies them for the labour force (17 to 65).  
Household wealth. Household wealth measured by wealth and asset indices increased 
substantially between 2002 and 2006: the wealth index grew by 31 per cent and the asset 
index by 17 per cent (Table 4.5). In both rounds the wealth index is higher in urban areas 
than in rural areas, while the asset index is higher in rural areas than in urban areas. This is 
partly because the wealth index better measures urban wealth while the asset index is better 
suited to measuring rural wealth, since the asset index is composed of farm-related assets 
while the wealth index is mainly composed of household durables and access to services. As 
a result, the rural wealth index starting from a lower value has higher growth, while the urban 
asset index starting from a very low base registered higher growth.  
Shocks. In terms of shocks, 46 per cent of the households have suffered from either illness 
or death of a household member during the last four years (Table 4.6). Another 14 per cent 
have encountered theft. 30 per cent were affected by increased input prices, while 32 per 
cent were hurt by reduced output prices during the same period. Death of livestock (26 per 
cent), drought, crop failure or pests (48 per cent), and natural disaster (43 per cent) are also 
some of the major shocks having adverse impacts on households. The most common type of 
shock suffered by rural households is drought, crop failure and pests, which affects 72 per 
cent of households. This is followed by natural disasters (65 per cent), death or illness of 
household members (46 per cent) and adverse prices (40 per cent). In urban areas, on the 
other hand, it is death or illness of a household member that affects most of the survey 
subjects (46 per cent), followed by adverse prices and loss of jobs or shutdown of places of 
employment, with each shock affecting close to 20 per cent of the total households.  
Support programmes. From the information we obtained from the support programme 
module, we compared the distribution of support programmes provided since 2002 by 
location. We found out that those in rural areas benefit more from support than those in 
urban areas. Ninety-nine per cent of agricultural extension support, 85 per cent of Cash for 
Work and 90 per cent of Food for Work were provided to rural areas. Similarly, 83 per cent of 
health extension services, 77 per cent of credit support and 61 per cent of family planning 
services are rendered to rural households. Water well development support, cash/food aid 
(unconditional transfers) and irrigation development support, although small, are all biased 
towards rural areas. On the other hand, 97 per cent of education support and 88 per cent of 
support programmes for the prevention of mother to child HIV/AIDS transmission were 
offered to urban areas.  
The perceived impact of participation in support programmes since 2002 on the well-being of 
their children was assessed in the survey (Tables 4.9 to 4.11). Beneficiaries perceived that 
agricultural support allowed households to have more food of a better quality at their 
disposal, thereby benefiting children. Conditional transfers (both Cash for Work and Food for 
Work and credit support) were perceived as instrumental to having better quality food as well 
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as more food. Educational support programmes were considered to facilitate more resources 
for educational purposes.  
Information on households’ participation in PSNP comes from the income module of the 
household questionnaire. While PSNP started in 2005, how much income each household 
obtained over the last 12 months from PSNP was recorded in the income module of the 
survey data collected in the last quarter of 2006. PWP is one of the components of PSNP 
that is specifically designed for rural areas.5 About 46 per cent of the sample households in 
rural areas were involved in PWP (see Table 4.7 above). The average income a rural 
household obtained from the public work was found to be 368 Birr (£41.72) per year. When 
we consider the participants of PWP only, the average income a rural household obtained 
from PWP was about 795 Birr (£90.14) per year, which about 11 per cent of the total 
consumption expenditure. 
The second component of PSNP is the DSP, which provides cash/food handouts to 
households who cannot supply labour. In our sample about 24 per cent of the sample 
households (with 33 per cent from urban areas and 19 per cent from rural areas) received 
cash/food aid support for 12 months. The average income per household from the cash/food 
handout was 147 Birr (£16.67) per year. In urban areas, the average income from cash/food 
aid was 130 Birr, while it was 158 Birr for rural households. When considering the cash/food 
aid recipients only, the average income from direct support is 848 Birr per year, which is 
about 11 per cent of the total household consumption expenditure. In rural areas, the income 
households obtained from cash/food aid programme is slightly higher than the income 
obtained from PW P. In our survey data, about 18 per cent of the households are also 
involved in the agricultural extension programme. 
Child schooling and work. The enrolment and average grade completed by the 12-year-old 
children is presented in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. About 95 per cent of the children are enrolled in 
school and the mean highest grade completed by the children is grade four, with urban 
figures (4.9) slightly higher than rural (3.4). The school enrolment rate of the index children 
during Round 1 of the survey was 66 per cent; this increased to 95 per cent by Round 2. 
Disaggregating by rural/urban categories, the rural enrolment rate was 55 per cent and grew 
to 93 per cent in Round 2; while the enrolment rate in urban areas grew from 83 per cent in 
Round 1 to 96 per cent in Round 2. Looking at enrolment by gender indicates that girls have 
a slightly higher enrolment rate than boys, the mean grade in Round 2 being slightly higher 
for females in rural areas. In general, boys showed a lower enrolment rate and fewer average 
years of schooling than girls.  
The dropout rate of children from school between Round 1 and Round 2 surveys was very 
low: about 3 per cent for rural and 2 per cent for urban children (Table A4.2). The index 
children were asked during Round 2 if they have missed class for whole week over the last 
12 months. Only 14.3 per cent responded yes, with the urban figure (14.7 per cent) slightly 
higher than the rural (13.8 per cent). Missing classes for a whole week mainly occurred from 
October to January, when agricultural work (such as harvesting) is very intensive and 
children have to go to school (see Tables A4.2 and A4.3 in the Appendix). The main reasons 
for missing classes were that children had to do paid work (58 per cent) or were required for 
 
 
5 Although PSNP is designed officially for rural areas only, about 63 per cent of the household in one of our urban site 
(Fereweini, Senkata Town, Tigray) were found to be beneficiary of PWP component of the PSNP. No meaningful participation in 
PWP is reported in all other urban sites.  
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domestic or agricultural work (18 per cent) (see Table A4.4). In urban areas, 74 per cent of 
children missed school for a whole week due the need to work for pay.   
Only a very small proportion of the 12-year-old children (9.6 per cent) responded that they did 
not have enough time to study, with a slightly higher figure for rural areas (11 per cent). The 
main reasons given for this was that they were responsible for too many chores (49.4 per 
cent overall and 53 per cent for rural areas) and lack of adequate lighting (15.2 per cent with 
17.3 per cent for rural children). In order to allow more time for studying, children wish to 
reduce their work load (61.5 per cent with 63 per cent for rural children), have adequate 
lighting (24.4 per cent with 27.5 per cent for rural children) and allow study time at school 
(12.8 per cent with 10 per cent for rural children). However, a large proportion of children 
(about 20 per cent overall, and 17 per cent for rural children) responded that their home 
environment is not a convenient place to study. Of these, 73 per cent (12 per cent for rural 
children) have enough time. Hence for urban areas, it is not workload only that prohibits 
children, but inconvenient home environment. For rural areas, heavy work load and lack of 
proper lighting are the main reasons for not having enough time to study.  
The amount of time and participation rate of children in different activities are summarised in 
Tables 4.1 and 4.2. The number of hours children spend doing domestic chores (including 
child care) and paid and unpaid work outside the home amount to an average of 4.5 hours 
engaged in work activities during a typical day. The rural figures (5.2 hours) are higher than 
the urban figures (3.3 hours). The average time students need to travel to get to their 
respective schools is around half an hour (23 minutes for urban dwellers and almost 36 
minutes for rural students). 
Table 4.1. Time spent working on various activities in hours in a typical day in the 
previous week by children of  12 years old  
Type of child outcome variables Rural Urban Girls Boys Total 
Highest grade completed  3.44 4.86 4.10 3.92 4.01 
Hours index child spent on child care 0.62 0.60 0.77 0.46 0.61 
Hours index child spent on domestic work 2.28 2.16 2.83 1.66 2.23 
Hours index child spent on unpaid work outside home 2.33 0.57 1.03 2.18 1.62 
Hours index child spent on paid work outside home 2.17 0.42 0.90 2.01 1.47 
Hours index child worked outside home, paid and 
unpaid  
0.16 0.15 0.13 0.17 0.15 
Hours child spent on child care and domestic activities  2.90 2.76 3.59 2.12 2.84 
Total hours index child spent all types of work   5.23 3.33 4.63 4.31 4.46 
Total  hours child spent on schooling  5.12 5.87 5.49 5.36 5.42 
Total hours child spent on studying at home  1.59 1.94 1.71 1.75 1.73 
 
PRODUCTIVE SAFETY NET PROGRAMME AND CHILDREN’S TIME USE BETWEEN  
WORK AND SCHOOLING IN ETHIOPIA 
 20 
Table 4.2. Participation rate (%) of  children (12 years old) in various activities in a typical 
day in the previous week 
Rural Urban All Participation (%) 
Girls Boys Total Girls Boys Total Total 
Enrolment in school 94.3 91.4 92.8 98.0 97.0 97.5 94.7 
Child care 44.5 29.6 36.8 39.1 29.1 34.1 35.7 
Domestic work 96.1 76.7 86.1 94.4 83.4 88.9 87.2 
Unpaid work outside home 47.3 81.7 65.1 9.6 21.1 15.4 45.0 
Paid work outside home 4.9 5.6 5.3 2.0 4.5 3.3 4.5 
Child work outside home paid and 
unpaid 
50.2 83.7 67.5 11.7 23.6 17.7 47.3 
Child care and domestic activities 96.5 80.4 88.2 95.9 87.9 91.9 89.7 
All types of activities 100.0 99.7 99.8 97.0 91.5 94.2 97.6 
Table 4.3. Enrolment rate of  index children (12 years old) by gender  
Rural Urban Total Sex of child 
Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Round 2 
Girls 54.1 94.3 82.7 98.0 65.8 95.8 
Boys 56.1 91.4 82.4 97.0 66.6 93.6 
Total 55.1 92.8 82.6 97.5 66.2 94.7 
  
Table 4.4. Average grade completed of  12-year-old children in Round 1 (R1) and 
Round 2 (R2) 
Rural Urban Total Change between rounds Sex of child  
R1 R2 R1 R2 R1 R2 Rural Urban Total 
Girls 0.5 3.6 0.9 4.9 0.7 4.1 3.1 4.0 3.4 
Boys 0.5 3.3 0.9 4.9 0.6 3.9 2.8 4.0 3.3 
Total 0.5 3.4 0.9 4.9 0.6 4.0 2.9 4.0 3.4 
 
Table 4.5. Level of  wealth and asset indices and change in indices between Round 1 
and Round 2    
 Urban Rural Total 
Round 2 wealth index  0.379 0.137 0.235 
Round 1 wealth index  0.319 0.084 0.179 
Change in wealth index (%) 0.187 0.635 0.312 
Round 2 asset index  0.161 0.280 0.232 
Round 1 asset index  0.129 0.245 0.198 
Change in asset index  (%)  0.255 0.141 0.171 
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Table 4.6. Percentage of  households affected by various shocks in the last 4 years: 
older cohort  
Type of shock Urban Rural Total 
Dummy for illness of household members  35.10 37.16 36.33 
Dummy for death or illness of household members  46.46 45.89 46.12 
Dummy for theft  13.13 13.87 13.57 
Dummy for increase in input price 19.19 37.67 30.20 
Dummy for decrease in output price  20.45 39.90 32.04 
Dummy for  death of livestock dummy 8.08 37.67 25.71 
Dummy for place of employment shutdown or job loss 17.93 5.31 10.41 
Dummy for drought  6.57 46.92 30.61 
Dummy for drought, crop failure and pests and diseases  12.37 72.26 48.06 
Dummy for divorce or separation of family 3.03 1.71 2.24 
Dummy for any dispute 3.79 5.31 4.69 
Dummy for confiscation of asset and abandoned credit sources 1.77 2.40 2.14 
Dummy for  having to pay for school  10.10 9.59 9.80 
Dummy for new HH member or birth  8.84 21.23 16.22 
Dummy for migration  0.51 0.34 0.41 
Dummy for  natural disaster and  drought combined 10.35 65.07 42.96 
Table 4.7 Involvement in and income (Birr per year) from PSNP: Public work and direct 
support in the last 12 months from the survey time  
 Rural Urban Total 
% participating in PSNP: pubic work programme  46.2 9.1 31.2 
% received direct support from PSNP  18.7 32.8 24.4 
Mean income from public work, PSNP  367.76 48.30 238.67 
Mean income direct support , PSNP 158.34 130.35 147.03 
Table 4.8. Percentage of  households who have had support from various programmes 
since 2002: older cohort  
Support type Variable name   Urban Rural Total 
Agricultural extension  agextr2 0.3 17.8 10.7 
Cash for Work  cfwr2 5.1 13.4 10.0 
Food for Work  ffwr2 3.5 14.6 10.1 
Cash and Food for Work combined cffwr2 8.6 27.9 20.1 
Credit support  creditr2 6.6 9.9 8.6 
Support from health extension agent  hlthextr2 0.5 2.9 1.9 
Health support  hlthr2 2.0 2.9 2.6 
Education support  edur2 14.4 0.2 5.9 
Food aid   faidr2 7.8 11.3 9.9 
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Credit Food aid 
Better quality food 26.85 21.64 49.51 27.56 44.03 
More food 55.7 61.99 46.6 51.24 46.27 
More resources for educational purposes 4.7 9.36 1.46 8.83 3.73 
More time to study - - - 0.35 - 
Less time on work activities 2.68 1.17 0.49 1.06 1.49 
Less time on household chores  1.75   1.49 
Other 0.67 1.17 0.49 6.01  
Table 4.10: Perceived benefits YL child obtains from the programmes (%) in urban areas 
  Food aid Education support 
Better quality food 30 4.29 
More food 52.5 8.57 
More advice on caring practices 0 0 
More resources for educational purposes 12.5 81.43 
More health care treatment 0 1.43 
More time to study 0 0 
Less time on work activities 0 0 
Less time on household chores 5 2.86 
Other 0 1.43 
5. Estimation results and 
discussions  
Following Wooldridge (2001) and Cameron and Trivedi (2005), we implemented an exercise 
estimating the impact of support programmes on children’s allocation of time to work and 
schooling/studying. First we estimated a logit model of propensity score (i.e. logit model of w 
on a set of x variables). The x variables chosen were Round 1 household composition, 
wealth index and asset index, dummy variables for a household affected by crop failure, 
death of cattle, death and illness of family members within the 5 years prior to the survey, 
as well as the square and interaction of the variables. These variables are consistent with the 
selection criteria used by the communities to select beneficiaries of EGS and PSNP 
programmes (see section 3 of the paper). We used the Ramsey Reset test to see if there 
were any omitted variables in the model and found no omitted variable bias. We use 
stata ‘psmatch2’ command (Leuven and Sianesi 2003) and kernel smoothing to match 
treatment and comparison observations and to estimate the treatment effect on the treated 
group. Standard errors are computed using the bootstrap method. Unlike nearest 
neighbourhood matching, using the bootstrap method to estimate standard errors after kernel 
matching gives valid estimators (Gilligan and Hoddinott 2007).  
We used different specifications of logit models to estimate propensity scores (Dehejia and 
Wahba 1999, 2002) in order to ensure balancing condition. When we got many unbalanced 
strata (after testing the balancing property), the logit model was re-estimated with an 
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improved specification that included interactions and higher order terms among the 
regressors, x.   
Since the AEP and Cash/Food for Work for both PWP and EGS are specifically designed for 
rural areas, we limited the sample to rural areas when we assessed the impact of PWP, EGS 
and AEP. The impact of food aid was estimated for both rural and urban areas. In urban 
areas, we found many of the cash/food handouts are provided not only as food aid, but also 
as education support.  
5.1 Propensity score matching regression 
The logit model of propensity score was estimated for three kinds of programme: (1) rural 
PWP, such as Cash and Food for Work support programmes; (2) the agricultural extension 
support programme in rural areas; and (3) DSP, including cash and food handouts as aid and 
education support for both rural and urban areas. Since the first two support programmes 
have differences between rural and urban areas, we ran separate logistic regression 
(propensity score) for rural and urban areas. Public work (Cash/Food for Work) and 
agricultural extension support programmes (AEP) are observed only in rural areas and are 
not captured in urban areas in our survey data. The DSP component of the PSNP (cash/food 
and education support) has been implemented in both rural and urban areas. Therefore, for 
rural areas, we estimated the impact of public work and agricultural extension programmes 
on hours spent by children on various activities and education, while we estimated the impact 
of direct support (cash/food aid and education support programmes) for both rural and urban 
areas.   
The results of the first stage regression and descriptive statistics of the variables used for the 
three programmes are provided in Tables A5.1 to A5.5. As there are no guidelines on how to 
choose conditioning variables, x (Smith and Todd 2005), we selected x variables that affect 
both the outcome and the participation in programmes intuitively. We mainly used initial 
conditions (household composition, human capital and physical wealth) and shocks observed 
before the first round survey and shocks observed between the first and second round 
survey period. We also included site dummies in the set of conditioning variables, which we 
found very helpful in meeting the balancing property. Standard errors were computed using 
the bootstrap method.  
Although the model used to estimate propensity score need not be perfectly accurate for 
estimating a program impact (Cameroon and Trivedi 2005), it might be good to revaluate the 
models of the propensity score or first stage regressions. The propensity score models fit 
quite well. The Pseudo R2 is 36.5 per cent for PWP in rural areas (Table A5.1) and 22 per 
cent for DSP (cash/food aid and education support) in rural and urban areas combined 
(Table A5.3). The Pseudo R2 for logistic regression of participation in the agricultural 
extension programme in rural areas is 40.6 per cent (Table A5.2). Balancing conditions for all 
three propensity score models was obtained. In total we have 955 observations, with 352 
from urban areas and 584 from rural areas. We also estimated the treatment effect for boys 
and girls separately for all the support programmes considered above.  
5.2 Treatment effect of support programmes in rural and urban areas  
We analysed treatment of the support programmes on the highest grade completed and 
hours per day children spent on various activities including work, schooling and studying at 
home. The types of child work and other activities we considered were (1) paid and unpaid 
work outside home; (2) unpaid work outside home; (3) paid work outside home; (4) child care 
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and domestic work; (5) all types of work including paid and unpaid, as well as at home and 
outside home; (6) schooling; and (7) studying at home. We analysed the treatment effect 
separately for rural and urban areas as well as for boys and girls.  
PWP (a component of  PSNP) in rural areas. As pointed out above, the PWP in Ethiopia 
requires households to supply labour in return for a daily unskilled wage. Hence, PWP has 
both substitution and income effects on children’s time use for various activities - namely paid 
and unpaid work, schooling and studying at home, as well as on the highest grade 
completed. Depending on the net effect of the substitution and income effects, PWP may 
increase or decrease children’s time spent on work, schooling and study, and grade 
completed. The treatment effect estimated provides the net effects.  
The treatment effects of PWP on the schooling, work and other activities of rural children are 
provided in Table 5.1a. We found that PWP has a positive effect on paid work and paid and 
unpaid work combined, and a negative effect on childcare and household chores and total 
work. However, the treatment effect is statistically significant for the hours spent on paid work 
(which is positive) and childcare and household chores (which is negative). On the other 
hand, PWP has a positive effect on the time children spend on schooling, studying and on 
the highest grade completed, although these effects are not statistically significant. 
Consequently, we found that PWP increases paid work outside the home by 0.13 hours per 
day and reduces child care and household chores by 0.57 hours per day, implying that the 
income effect dominates the substitution effect for child care and household chores, and that 
substitution effect dominates the income effect for paid work. The increase in paid work 
outside the home could be due to the direct involvement of children in public work, or the 
substitution of child for adults when adults go into public work. Although further investigation 
is required, our qualitative assessment in 2008 indicated that children are involved to some 
extent in paid work around their community and in  PWPs, despite the regulation that officially 
stipulates that boys are not allowed to participate in PWP.  
When we analysed the effect of PWP by gender, for girls we found a statistically significant 
effect of PWP on paid work outside the home, childcare and household chores, studying at 
home only for girls. The effect is positive for paid work (0.25 hours more per day), negative 
for child care and household chores (0.50 hours less per day) and positive for studying time, 
with a net effect of reducing child work and increasing studying time as a whole. For boys, a 
positive and statistically significant effect was found only for childcare and household chores 
(0.57 hours less per day). No significant effect on grade completed was found for either girls 
or boys.  
There were 75 observations/households which participated in both the PWP and agricultural 
extension programmes. To check the sensitivity of the result, we estimated the impact of 
PWP on all households excluding these 75. There was no change in the estimated impact of 
PWP on girls’ use of time for work or schooling. However, the effect of PWP on child care 
and household chores for boys turned out to be insignificant.  
We also estimated the impact of the EGS that existed before 2005 (Table 5.1b). As with 
PWP, we found the impact of EGS on girls’ and boys’ use of time on paid work and girls’ use 
of time on studying are positive. However, unlike PWP (PSNP), the impact of EGS on boys’ 
and girls’ hours of work per day on child care and household chores is not statistical 
significant. Moreover, the positive impact of EGS on child work for pay (0.26 hours per day) is 
twice that of the PWP of the PSNP (0.13 hours per day). These results imply that in terms of 
the child welfare outcome, the PWP of the PSNP is much better than that of its predecessor, 
EGS.  
PRODUCTIVE SAFETY NET PROGRAMME AND CHILDREN’S TIME USE BETWEEN  
WORK AND SCHOOLING IN ETHIOPIA 
 25 
Agricultural Extension Programme (AEP) in rural areas. Many farmers are part of the 
agricultural extension support programme, through which they are encouraged to adopt 
labour- and land-augmenting technologies like fertiliser, improved seeds and new cultural 
practices. In our survey data, about 18 per cent of households are involved in the agricultural 
extension programme. The programme may have both substitution and income effects with 
regard to the use of children’s time for work and education. What we found is that the income 
effect is large enough to be dominated by the substitution effect and the net effect of 
agricultural extension support programmes is negative for child work and positive for 
schooling and study time. This is stronger than the effect of PWP on child work and schooling 
and study time. Among the activities, statistically significant negative impacts are found on 
time spent on paid work and total work (Table 5.2). The impact of the agricultural extension 
support programme is -0.50 hours for total work and -0.23 hours for paid work in a typical 
day. However, we could find no statistically significant effect on unpaid work in terms of farm 
work and cattle herding. This might be due to the fact that working on the farm and herding 
cattle are traditionally the duties of children. Regarding education, we found a positive and 
statistically significant effect on schooling and studying time. Although not statistically 
significant at 10 per cent, the effect on grades completed by children is positive and 
statistically significant at the 15 per cent level.    
When disaggregated by gender, we obtained a slightly different result in favour of girls. While 
the result remains the same for boys, for girls we found the agricultural extension programme 
significantly reduces girls’ time spent on paid work, childcare and household chores and total 
work. The agricultural extension programme has a positive and statistically significant effect 
on hours per day which girls spend on studying (0.92 more hours per day) and on girls’ 
highest grade completed (0.53 years more), implying that AEP is more favourable for girls 
than boys. The difference in the magnitude of the effect on child work between girls and boys 
is also remarkable. While the effect of AEP on paid work, childcare and household chores, 
and total work for girls are -0.26, -0.42, and -0.61 hours per day respectively, for boys these 
figures are -0.22, -0.61, and -0.32 hours per day. Moreover, the effect on studying time is an 
increase of 0.93 hours (55 minutes) per day, whilst the highest grade completed is increased 
by 0.53 year.   
To sum up, the income effect dominates the substitution effect for AEP. The main reasons 
the agricultural extension programme performs better than PWP in terms of child welfare is 
that the return from the agricultural support programme is very high and farmers can hire 
labour for farming activities, while it is difficult to hire labour to substitute child labour in case 
of EGS. As a result, the agricultural support programme does not encourage households to 
use child time for work.  
Although the PWP is not found to be effective in increasing children’s attainment of grades 
and the time boys spend on studying at home, it does not encourage children to be more 
highly involved in work. Compared to EGS (its predecessor), PWP is more effective in 
reducing child work. Specifically, it helps households to reduce the amount of time children 
spend on child care and household chores. However, compared to AEP, the performance of 
PWP is lower in terms of increasing the time children spend on schooling, studying time and 
girls’ highest grade completed. The possible reasons for the lower performance of PWP in 
reducing child labour and improving studying and attainment in school are that the return 
people get from PWP is very low and as a result it does not have a significant income effect 
on the household. The total amount of income households obtained from PSNP was around 
11 per cent of the total consumption expenditure. Hence possible action to reduce the 
negative welfare impact of PWP are (1) to increase the wage rate households receive when 
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participating in PWP so as to make the income effect sufficiently higher than the substitution 
effect; (2) to make sending children to school a conditionality for households to be 
beneficiaries of PWP; and (3) to design a special programme that targets children instead of 
the household head only, for example, schooling feeding programmes. Putting an effective 
control system in place to enforce the government regulation banning child work in PWP 
might also be a possible way of reducing children’ involvement in paid work.  
DSP in rural and urban areas. DSP is one component of PSNP in Ethiopia. We have 
observed cash/food aid in both rural and urban areas and the cash handouts in urban areas 
which are also given to support children’s education. For both rural and urban areas we have 
assessed the impact of the direct support component of the safety net programme, including 
the effects of cash/food aid and education support programmes on child work, time spent on 
schooling and studying, and highest grade completed by 12-year-old children. The results 
are provided in Table 5.3. Since the DSP does not require households to supply labour as 
condition of obtaining payment from the programme, we expected an income effect only, in 
the sense that if the programme is effective it should reduce child work and increase 
schooling and studying time and highest grade completed by children.  
Our findings suggest that the DSP is effective in reducing child work and increasing children’s 
schooling and studying at home. It also has a limited effect on the highest grade completed 
by children.  
It seems that child total work declines by 0.65 hours per typical day (0.54 and 0.77 hours less 
per day for girls and boys respectively) as a result of households’ participation in the DSPs, 
which is statistically significant for both boys and girls. The direct support is also found to 
have a negative and statistically significant effect on child work for paid and unpaid work 
outside the home and a positive effect on schooling and the highest grade completed by 
children. However, the effect of direct support on schooling and the highest grade completed 
is limited for urban boys.  
The result seems not contrary to households’ perception regarding the impact of these 
programmes on household and child welfare. Many households reported that the food aid 
and education support programmes have helped them to access a greater quantity and 
quality of food, but do not increase the time children spend on schooling and studying or 
reduce time spent working.  
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Table 5.1a. Impact of  the PWP of  the PSNP on hours spent in a typical day on work, 
schooling and studying and on grade completed by children of  12 years old 
in rural areas (kernel matching)  
Outcome ATTk S.E. T-stat 
All children  (N=584)    
Paid and unpaid work outside home 0.325 0.207 1.570 
    Unpaid work outside home 0.191 0.200 0.960 
    Paid work outside home 0.134 0.070 1.920 
Child care and household chores  -0.567 0.172 -3.300 
Total work  -0.269 0.199 -1.350 
Schooling  0.146 0.163 0.900 
Studying  0.133 0.089 1.490 
Grade completed  0.249 0.166 1.500 
Girls (N=283)    
Paid and unpaid work outside home 0.400 0.254 1.570 
    Unpaid work outside home 0.146 0.239 0.610 
    Paid work outside home 0.254 0.092 2.760 
Child care and household chores  -0.501 0.235 -2.140 
Total work  -0.115 0.271 -0.420 
Schooling  0.250 0.230 1.090 
Studying  0.255 0.123 2.070 
Grade completed  0.184 0.233 0.790 
Boys (N=301)    
Paid and unpaid work outside home 0.194 0.284 0.680 
    Unpaid work outside home 0.173 0.278 0.620 
    Paid work outside home 0.021 0.105 0.200 
Child care and household chores  -0.571 0.205 -2.780 
Total work  -0.416 0.290 -1.430 
Schooling  0.056 0.231 0.240 
Studying  0.020 0.129 0.160 
Grade completed  0.323 0.233 1.390 
For two tail test and for n>120,  T values for 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance are 2.576, 1.96, and  1.645 respectively; 
ATTk=average treatment effect of the treated using kernel matching  
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Table 5.1b. Impact of  EGS on hours spent in a typical day on work, schooling and 
studying and on grade completed by children of  12 years old in rural areas 
(kernel matching)  
Outcome ATTk S.E. T-stat 
All children (N=538)    
Paid and unpaid work outside home 0.309 0.200 1.540 
    Unpaid work outside home 0.043 0.192 0.230 
    Paid work outside home 0.266 0.078 3.400 
Child care and household chores  -0.310 0.160 -1.940 
Total work  -0.009 0.190 -0.050 
Schooling  -0.355 0.158 -2.250 
Studying  -0.018 0.086 -0.210 
Grade completed  0.042 0.160 0.260 
Girls (N=255)       
Paid and unpaid work outside home -0.004 0.254 -0.020 
    Unpaid work outside home -0.263 0.239 -1.100 
    Paid work outside home 0.259 0.115 2.250 
Child care and household chores  -0.149 0.224 -0.670 
Total work  -0.136 0.243 -0.560 
Schooling  -0.246 0.228 -1.080 
Studying  0.208 0.127 1.630 
Grade completed  0.198 0.232 0.850 
Boys (N=277)       
Paid and unpaid work outside home 0.055 0.269 0.210 
    Unpaid work outside home -0.120 0.261 -0.460 
    Paid work outside home 0.176 0.100 1.760 
Child care and household chores  -0.013 0.196 -0.070 
Total work  0.012 0.275 0.040 
Schooling  -0.360 0.221 -1.630 
Studying  -0.182 0.123 -1.480 
Grade completed  0.017 0.225 0.070 
For two tail test and for n>120,  T values for 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance are 2.576, 1.96, and  1.645 respectively; 
ATTk=average treatment effect of the treated using kernel matching  
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Table 5.2. Impact of  agricultural extension support programme on hours spent in a 
typical day on work, schooling and studying and on grade completed 12-
year-old children in rural areas (kernel matching)  
Outcome ATTk S.E. T-stat 
All children (N=584)    
Paid and unpaid work outside home -0.294 0.245 -1.200 
    Unpaid work outside home -0.056 0.242 -0.230 
    Paid work outside home -0.238 0.053 -4.480 
Child care and household chores  -0.190 0.195 -0.980 
Total work  -0.503 0.218 -2.310 
Schooling  0.717 0.180 3.970 
Studying  0.202 0.111 1.810 
Grade completed  0.314 0.200 1.570 
Girls  (N=283)   Girls    
Paid and unpaid work outside home -0.186 0.276 -0.670 
    Unpaid work outside home 0.078 0.266 0.290 
    Paid work outside home -0.264 0.079 -3.320 
Child care and household chores  -0.418 0.224 -1.860 
Total work  -0.614 0.285 -2.150 
Schooling  0.927 0.217 4.270 
Studying  0.134 0.138 0.970 
Grade completed  0.534 0.241 2.220 
Boys (N=301)  Boys    
Paid and unpaid work outside home 0.317 0.363 0.870 
    Unpaid work outside home 0.535 0.361 1.480 
    Paid work outside home -0.218 0.072 -3.040 
Child care and household chores  -0.618 0.290 -2.130 
Total work  -0.326 0.334 -0.980 
Schooling  0.321 0.319 1.000 
Studying  0.290 0.196 1.480 
Grade completed  -0.095 0.346 -0.270 
For two tail test and for n>120,  T values for 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance are 2.576, 1.96, and  1.645 respectively; 
ATTk=average treatment effect of the treated using kernel matching  
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Table 5.3. Impact of  DSP on children’s time use in hours per typical day in on work, 
schooling and studying and on grade completed by children of  12 years old 
in rural and urban areas (kernel matching) 
Rural+Urban Rural Urban 




(n=955)     (N=565)     (N=390)     
All children          
Paid and unpaid work outside 
home 
-0.796 0.139 -5.71 -0.643 0.223 -2.88 -0.316 0.144 -2.19 
    Unpaid work outside home -0.697 0.128 -5.45 -0.59 0.2 -2.95 -0.164 0.12 -1.36 
    Paid work outside home -0.1 0.052 -1.93 -0.053 0.084 -0.63 -0.152 0.079 -1.93 
Child care and household 
chores  
0.129 0.146 0.88 0.587 0.202 2.9 -0.259 0.208 -1.24 
Total work  -0.652 0.181 -3.59 -0.018 0.24 -0.07 -0.577 0.236 -2.44 
Schooling  -0.063 0.139 -0.45 -0.544 0.197 -2.76 0.119 0.184 0.65 
Studying  0.049 0.081 0.61 -0.126 0.104 -1.21 0.099 0.12 0.82 
Grade completed 0.492 0.14 3.5 0.178 0.206 0.86 0.276 0.167 1.66 
Girls   (N=464)     (N=271)      (N=194)   
Paid and unpaid work outside 
home 
-0.531 0.151 -3.53 -0.536 0.247 -2.17 -0.042 0.15 -0.28 
    Unpaid work outside home -0.373 0.143 -2.61 -0.379 0.24 -1.58 0.107 0.122 0.88 
    Paid work outside home -0.159 0.047 -3.34 -0.157 0.056 -2.8 -0.149 0.09 -1.65 
Child care and household 
chores  
-0.001 0.212 0 0.343 0.287 1.2 -0.183 0.314 -0.58 
Total work  -0.538 0.241 -2.23 -0.2 0.332 -0.6 -0.229 0.329 -0.7 
Schooling  -0.265 0.211 -1.26 -1.013 0.298 -3.4 0.132 0.277 0.48 
Studying  -0.034 0.106 -0.32 -0.215 0.151 -1.43 0.017 0.15 0.12 
Grade completed 0.316 0.2 1.58 -0.047 0.3 -0.16 0.094 0.244 0.38 
Boys   (N=490)     (N=294)     (N=196)    
Paid and unpaid work outside 
home 
-0.972 0.227 -4.28 -0.737 0.335 -2.2 -0.539 0.241 -2.24 
    Unpaid work outside home -0.936 0.204 -4.6 -0.78 0.286 -2.73 -0.399 0.202 -1.97 
    Paid work outside home -0.036 0.094 -0.38 0.044 0.154 0.29 -0.14 0.131 -1.07 
Child care and household 
chores  
0.163 0.169 0.96 0.806 0.248 3.25 -0.536 0.218 -2.46 
Total work  -0.77 0.27 -2.85 0.151 0.349 0.43 -1.075 0.308 -3.49 
Schooling  0.114 0.18 0.63 -0.11 0.255 -0.43 0.101 0.239 0.42 
Studying  0.136 0.123 1.1 -0.044 0.145 -0.3 0.209 0.194 1.08 
Grade completed 0.665 0.198 3.35 0.385 0.287 1.34 0.484 0.222 2.18 
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6. Conclusion and policy 
implications  
Ethiopia’s public employment programme started in the 1980s and was associated with the 
rehabilitation programme known as the Food for Work programme. From 1997 to 2004, the 
government introduced relief-based Cash and Food for Work programmes known as EGS. 
Associated with these, there were Free Food Aid Programmes that provided food aid to 
people affected by drought. In 2005, a new public employment programme popularly known 
as the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) was established in order to support 
households in absolute poverty and to protect households from falling into poverty. The 
PSNP has two components, namely the Public Work Programme (PWP) and Direct Support 
Programme (DSP). While beneficiaries have to supply labour in return for a daily unskilled 
wage to be part of the PWP, poor people unable to supply labour are entitled to be part of the 
DSP in order to get free cash and/or food aid. Complementary to PSNP is an agricultural 
extension support programme designed to help households involved in agriculture proper. 
This paper tries to identify the effect of households’ involvement in PWP, DSP and the 
agricultural extension programme on the time allocation of children to work, schooling and 
studying at home. Children’s work is considered as total work, and paid work and unpaid 
work separately. The effect on time allocation is also disaggregated by the gender of the 
children.  
Although the PWP component of PSNP increased the amount of time both girls and boys 
spent on paid work by 0.13 hours per day, it reduced the amount of time girls spent on child 
care and household chores by half an hour per day. The net effect is that children’s total hours 
spent on work are reduced. Moreover, PWP also increased the time girls spent on studying by 
0.25 hours per day. In terms of child welfare outcome, the effect of the PWP of the PSNP is 
much better than that of its predecessor, EGS. The positive impact of the PWP of the PSNP 
on paid child work (0.13 hours per day) is half of that of EGS (0.26 hours per day). Moreover, 
EGS did not reduce the amount of time boys and girls spent on childcare and household 
chores. Rather, it reduced boys’ time spent on schooling (0.36 hours less per day).  
Direct support (the second component of PSNP) was found to be effective in reducing child 
work in paid and unpaid activities and in increasing grades completed by boys in both rural 
and urban areas. In rural areas, boys’ hours of unpaid work outside home and girls’ hours of 
childcare and household chores declined. For urban areas, girls’ hours of paid work and 
boys’ hours of paid and unpaid work and total work declined significantly. We also found that 
the grade boys completed in urban areas increased by half a year.  
Substantial number of households have participated in the agricultural extension programme 
in order to get expert advice on the use of modern inputs and improved cultural practices, 
such as modern hoeing, weeding, harvesting and irrigation techniques. Such practices have 
the potential to increase farm income and labour use, and hence children from households 
which obtained agricultural extension support may work less and spend more time in 
schooling and studying at home if households get richer as a result of the support 
programme. On the other hand, if households cannot meet the increased demand for labour 
by using adult family and/or hired labour, children may spend increased time working and 
less on schooling and studying at home. In our Young Lives sample households, we found 
the latter effect (substitution effect) is dominated by the former (income effect) and as a 
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result, participation of households in the agricultural support programme reduced hours spent 
on paid work (0.23 hour less per day) and childcare and household chores for girls and boys 
(0.41 and 0.61 hours less per day, respectively) and increases hours of schooling time spent 
by 0.92 hours per day.  
To conclude, although PSNP targets households, it has been instrumental in improving child 
well-being in terms of reducing total time spent on working, childcare and household chores 
and increasing girls’ time spent on studying, which has a strong implication for the quality of 
education. However, the PWP part of the PSNP is still not effective enough to reduce 
children’s involvement in paid work, or to increase the highest grade completed and time 
children spent on studying at home. Since the programme started only 12 months prior to 
survey, it is too early to capture the full impact of the programme.  
The implications of the study are, therefore, that programmes have to be designed in such a 
way as to be compatible with household behaviour in order to reduce the negative effects of 
PWP on children. Consideration should be given to shifting the support programme from 
PWP to conditional on school attendance; and to supporting households through activities 
that have a higher income effect than substitution effect, such as extension support. 
Moreover, the design of the PSNP should consider the substitution effect on children and 
hence target children instead of households. In this regard, perhaps considering changing 
part of the PWP into school feeding would be important. Moreover, the gender impacts of 
labour requirements need further attention to ensure that programmes do not have negative 
impacts for women/men and girls/boys. Households unable to provide adult labour should 
receive direct support. The payment made to beneficiaries of PWP was not high enough to 
discourage children from engaging in paid and unpaid work. It would therefore be desirable 
to increase the payment for public work to make it more beneficial to children. In particular, 
payment in real terms should be set reasonably high by indexing the wage rate to inflation. 
PRODUCTIVE SAFETY NET PROGRAMME AND CHILDREN’S TIME USE BETWEEN  
WORK AND SCHOOLING IN ETHIOPIA 
 33 
 References  
Anker, R. (2000) ‘The Economics of Child Labour: A Framework for Measurement’, 
International Labour Review 139.3: 257-80 
Assaad, Ragui, Deborah Levison and Nadia Zibani (2006) ‘The Effect of Child Work on 
Schooling: Evidence from Egypt’, http://www.gdnet.org/fulltext/Assaad%20_child%20work.pdf 
(accessed 26 Nov 2008) 
Attanasio, Orazio, Emla Fitzsimons, Ana Gomez, Diana Lopez, Costas Meghir and Alice 
Mesnard (2006) Child Education and Work Choices in the Presence of  a Conditional Cash 
Transfer Programme in Rural Colombia, CEPR Discussion Papers 5792, CEPR  
Baland, Jean-Marie and James A. Robinson (2000) ‘Is Child Labour Inefficient?’, Journal of  
Political Economy 108.4: 663–81 
Basu, K. and P.H. Van (1998) ‘The Economics of Child Labour’, American Economic Review 
88.3: 412-27 
Becker, G. (1965) ‘A Theory of the Allocation of Time’, Economic Journal 75.299: 493-517 
Becker, G. and N. Tomes (1976) ‘Child Endowment and the Quantity and Quality of 
Children’, Journal of  Political Economy 87: 1153-89 
Becker, S. O. and A. Ichino (2002) ‘Estimation of Average Treatment Effects based on 
Propensity Scores’, Stata Journal 2: 358–77 
Beegle, Kathleen., Rajeev H. Dehejia and Roberta Gatti (2003) Child Labour, Income 
Shocks, and Access to Credit, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3075, 
Washington DC: World Bank 
Beegle, Kathleen, Rajeev H. Dehejia and Roberta Gatti (2006) ‘Child Labour and Agricultural 
Shocks’, Journal of  Development Economics 81.1: 80–96 
Bhalotra, S. and C. Heady (2003) ‘Child Farm Labour: The Wealth Paradox’, World Bank 
Economic Review 17.2: 197–227  
Birdsall, Nancy and Richard Sabot (eds.) (1996) Opportunity Foregone: Education in Brazil, 
Washington: Inter-American Development Bank 
Borchgrevink, A., T. Woldehanna, G. Ageba and W. Teshome (2005) Marginalized Groups, 
Credit and Empowerment: A Study of  the Dedebit Credit and Savings Institution (DECSI) of  
Tigray, Ethiopia, AEMFI Occasional Paper No. 14., Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 
Bourguignon, Francois, Francisco Ferreira and Philippe Leite (2003) ‘Conditional Cash 
Transfers, Schooling and Child Labour: Micro-Simulating Brazil’s Bolsa Escola Programme’, 
World Bank Economic Review 17.2: 229-54 
Canals-Cerdá, José and Cristóbal Ridao-Cano (2004) The Dynamics of  School and Work in 
Rural Bangladesh, World Bank Policy Research Working Papers 3330, Washington DC: 
World Bank  
Cardoso, Eliana and Andre Portela Souza (2004) The Impact of  Cash Transfers on Child 
Labour and School Attendance in Brazil, Vanderbilt University Working Paper No. 04-W07, 
Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University  
Cochran, W. and D.B. Rubin (1973) ‘Controlling Bias in Observational Studies’, Sankyha 35: 
417-46  
PRODUCTIVE SAFETY NET PROGRAMME AND CHILDREN’S TIME USE BETWEEN  
WORK AND SCHOOLING IN ETHIOPIA 
 34 
Conway, T. and A. Norton (2002) ‘Nets, Ropes, Ladders and Trampolines: The Place of 
Social Protection within Current Debates on Poverty Reduction’, Development Policy Review 
20.5: 533-40 
Coulombe, H. (1998) ‘Child Labour and Education in Côte d’Ivoire’, World Bank Working 
Paper, unpublished, Washington DC: World Bank 
Cunningham, Wendy V. and William F. Maloney (2000) ‘Child Labour and Schooling 
Decisions’, unpublished, Washington DC: World Bank 
Dar, Amit, Niels-Hugo Blunch, Bona Kim and Masaru Sasaki (2002) Participation of Children 
in Schooling and Labour Activities: A Review of Empirical Studies, Social Protection 
discussion paper 0221, Washington DC: World Bank 
de Janvry, Alain, Frederico Finan, Elisabeth Sadoulet and Renos Vakis (2006) ‘Can 
Conditional Cash Transfer Programmes Serve as Safety Nets in Keeping Children at School 
and from Working when Exposed to Shocks?’, Journal of  Development Economics 7.2:  
349-73  
Dehejia, Rajeev H. and Sadek Wahba (2002) ‘Propensity Score Matching Methods for Non-
Experimental Causal Studies’, Review of  Economics and Statistics 84.1: 151-61 
Dehejia, Rajeev H. and Sadek Wahba (1999) ‘Causal Effects in Nonexperimental Studies: 
Reevaluating the Evaluation of Training Programmes’, Journal of  the American Statistical 
Association 94.448: 1053-62 
Dehejia, Rajeev H. and Roberta Gatti (2005) ‘Child Labour: The Role of Income Variability 
and Access to Credit in a Cross Section of Countries’, Economic Development and Cultural 
Change 53.4: 913–32 
Dessy, S. E. (2000) ‘A Defense of Compulsory Measures against Child Labour’, Journal of  
Development Economics 62.1: 261–75 
Devereux, S. and R. Sabates-Wheeler (2004) Transformative Social Protection, IDS Working 
Paper No. 232, Brighton: IDS 
Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission, DPPC (2000) National Food Aid 
Targeting Guidelines, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Government of the Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia  
Dubois, Pierre, Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet (2003) Effects on School Enrolment 
and Performance of  a Conditional Transfers Programme in Mexico, Working Paper 981, 
Berkeley, CA: University of California, Berkeley 
Duryea, Suzanne (1997) Children's Advancement through School in Brazil: The Role of  
Transitory Shocks to Household Income, Working Paper 376, Washington DC: Inter-
American Development Bank 
Duryea, Suzanne, David Lam and Deborah Levison (2007) ‘Effects of Economic Shocks on 
Children's Employment and Schooling in Brazil’, Journal of  Development Economics 84.1: 
188–214 
Edmonds, Eric (2006) ‘Child Labour and Schooling Responses to Anticipated Income in 
South Africa’, Journal of  Development Economics 81.2: 386–414  
Edmonds, Eric (2005) ‘Does Child Labour Decline with Improving Economic Status’, Journal 
of  Human Resources 40.1: 77–99 
PRODUCTIVE SAFETY NET PROGRAMME AND CHILDREN’S TIME USE BETWEEN  
WORK AND SCHOOLING IN ETHIOPIA 
 35 
Edmonds, Eric (2004) Does Illiquidity Alter Child Labour and Schooling Decisions? Evidence 
from Household Responses to Anticipated Cash Transfers in South Africa, NBER Working 
Paper 10265, Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research 
Farrington, John, Rachel Slater and Rebecca Holmes (2004) The Search for Synergies 
between Social Protection and Livelihood Promotion: The Agriculture Case, Working Paper 
232, London: Overseas Development Institute 
Farrington, John and Rachel Slater (2006) ‘Introduction - Cash Transfers: Panacea for 
Poverty Reduction or Money Down the Drain?’, Development Policy Review 24.5: 499-511 
Frankenberg, Elizabeth, James P. Smith and Duncan Thomas (2003) ‘Economic Shocks, 
Wealth and Welfare’, Journal of  Human Resources 38.22: 280–321 
Funkhouser, Edward (1999) ‘Cyclical Economic Conditions and School Attendance in Costa 
Rica’, Economics of  Education Review 18.1: 31–50 
Gertler, Paul (2004) ‘Do Conditional Cash Transfers Improve Child Health? Evidence from 
Progresa’s Control Randomized Experiment’, The American Economic Review: Papers and 
Proceedings 94.2: 336-42 
Gilligan, Daniel O., J. Hoddinott, Alemayehu Seyoum Taffesse, Samson Dejene, Nigussie 
Tefera and Yisehac Yohannes (2007) ‘Ethiopia Food Security Programme: Report on 2006 
Baseline Survey’, unpublished, Washington DC: International Food Policy Research Institute 
Guarcello, L., F. Mealli and F. Rosati (2003) ‘Household Vulnerability and Child Labour: The 
Effects of Shocks, Credit Rationing, and Insurance’, http://www.ucw-
project.org/pdf/publications/standard_CL_and_Vulnerability.pdf (accessed 26 Nov 2008) 
Heckman, J.J., H. Ichimura and P.E. Todd (1997) ‘Matching as an Econometric Evaluation 
Estimator: Evidence from Evaluating a Job Training Programme’, Review of  Economic 
Studies 64.4: 605-54 
Holzmann, R. and S. Jorgensen (2000) Social Risk Management: A New Conceptual 
Framework for Social Protection and Beyond, Social Protection Discussion Paper 0006, 
Washington DC: World Bank  
Hyslop, Dean (1999) ‘State Dependence, Serial Correlation, and Heterogeneity in 
Intertemporal Labour Force Participation of Married Women’, Econometrica 67.6: 1255-94 
International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour and Statistical Information and 
Monitoring Programme on Child Labour (2002) Every Child Counts: New Global Estimates 
on Child Labour, Geneva: International Labour Office 
Imbens, G.W. (2000) ‘The Role of the Propensity Score in Estimating Dose-Response 
Functions’, Biometrika 87.3: 706-10 
Jacoby, H. and E. Skoufias (1997) ‘Risk, Financial Markets, and Human Capital in a 
Developing Country’, Review of  Economic Studies 64.3: 311-15 
Jensen, R. (2000) ‘Agricultural Volatility and Investments in Children’, American Economic 
Review 90.2: 399-404 
Kamermann, S. and S.G. Gabel (2006) ‘Social Protection for Children and their Families: A 
Global Overview’, paper presented at the conference on Social Protection Initiatives for 
Children, Graduate Programme in International Affairs at the New School, October 30 and 
31, 2006 
PRODUCTIVE SAFETY NET PROGRAMME AND CHILDREN’S TIME USE BETWEEN  
WORK AND SCHOOLING IN ETHIOPIA 
 36 
Kassa, Habtemariam (2008) ‘Agricultural Extension in Ethiopia: Historical Evolution, Relevant 
Policies, and Challenges’ in Taye Assefa (ed.) Digest of Ethiopian National Policies 
Strategies and Programmes, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Forum For Social Studies 
Kruger, Diana, Rodrigo R. Soares and Matias Berthelon (2007) Household Choices of  Child 
Labour and Schooling: A Simple Model with Application to Brazil, IZA Discussion Papers 
2776, Bonn, Germany: Institute for the Study of Labour  
Kruger, Diana I. (2007) ‘Coffee Production Effects on Child Labour and Schooling in Rural 
Brazil’, Journal of  Development Economics 82.2: 448-63 
Leuven, E. and B. Sianesi (2003) ‘PSMATCH2: Stata Module to Perform Full Mahalanobis 
and Propensity Score Matching, Common Support Graphing, and Covariate Imbalance 
Testing’, http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s432001.html (accessed 26 Nov 2008) 
Levison, Deborah, Karine Moe and Felicia Knaul (2001) ‘Youth Education and Work in 
Mexico’, World Development 29.1: 167-88  
López-Calva, Luis Felipe (2001) ‘Child Labour: Myths, Theories and Facts’, Journal of  
International Affairs 55.1: 1083-119 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (2004) Productive Safety Net Programme: 
Programme Implementation Manual, Addis Ababa: Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development  
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (2006) Productive Safety Net Programme: 
Programme Implementation Manual (Revised), Addis Ababa: Ministry of Agriculture and 
Rural Development  
Ministry of Agriculture (1994) The National Agricultural Extension System of  the Transitional 
Government of  Ethiopia, Task Force Evaluating Agricultural Extensions System (Amharic 
text), Addis Ababa: Ministry of Agriculture 
MoFED (2006) Ethiopia: Building on Progress; A Plan for Accelerated and Sustained 
Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) (2005/06-2009/10), Addis Ababa: Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Development 
Morley, Samuel and David Coady (2003) From Social Assistance to Social Development: 
Targeted Education Subsidies in Developing Countries, Washington DC: International Food 
Policy Research Institute 
Nielsen, Helena S. (1998) Child Labour and Schooling in Zambia, World Bank Working 
Paper, Washington DC: World Bank  
Parker, Susan and Emmanuel Skoufias (2006) ‘Labour Market Shocks and Their Impacts on 
Work and Schooling: Evidence from Urban Mexico’, Journal of  Population Economics 19.1: 
1-19 
Ranjan, Priya (2001) ‘Credit Constraints and the Phenomenon of Child Labour’, Journal of  
Development Economics 64.1: 81-102 
Rawlings, Laura B. (2005) ‘A New Approach to Social Assistance: Latin America’s 
Experience with Conditional Cash Transfer Programmes’, International Social Security 
Review 58.2-3: 133-61 
Rawlings, Laura B. and Gloria M Rubio (2005) ‘Evaluating the Impact of Conditional Cash 
Transfer Programmes’, World Bank Research Observer 20.1: 29-55 
PRODUCTIVE SAFETY NET PROGRAMME AND CHILDREN’S TIME USE BETWEEN  
WORK AND SCHOOLING IN ETHIOPIA 
 37 
Rosenbaum, P.R. and D.B. Rubin (1983) ‘The Central Role of the Propensity Score in 
Observational Studies for Causal Effects’, Biometrika 70.1: 41-55 
Rosenbaum, P.R. and D.B. Rubin (1985) ‘Constructing a Control Group Using Multivariate 
Matched Sampling Methods that Incorporate the Propensity Score’, The American 
Statistician 39.1: 33-8 
Rubin, D.B. (1980) ‘Bias Reduction Using Mahalanobis-Metric Matching’, Biometrics 36.4: 
293-98 
Rucci, Graciana (2004) ‘Macro Shocks and Schooling Decisions: the Case of Argentina’, 
http://www.cema.edu.ar/conferencias/download/Rucci.pdf (accessed 26 Nov 2008) 
Schady, Norbert and Maria Caridad Araujo (2006) Cash Transfers, Conditions, School 
Enrolment and Child Work: Evidence from a Randomised Experiment in Ecuador, Policy 
Research Working Paper Series 3930, Washington DC: World Bank 
Schultz, T. Paul (2004) ‘School Subsidies for the Poor: Evaluating the Mexican Progresa 
Poverty Programme’, Journal of  Development Economics 74.1: 199-250 
Skoufias, Emanuel and Susan W. Parker (2006) ‘Job Loss and Family Adjustments in Work 
and Schooling during the Mexican Peso Crisis’, Journal of  Population Economics 19.1: 163-
81 
Skoufias, Emmanuel and Susan Parker (2001) ‘Conditional Cash Transfers and their Impact 
on Child Work and School Enrolment: Evidence from the Progresa Programme in Mexico’, 
Economia 2.1: 45-96 
Smith, J.A. and P.E. Todd (2001) ‘Reconciling Conflicting Evidence on the Performance of 
Propensity-Score Matching Methods’, American Economic Review 91.2: 112-18  
Smith, J.A. and P.E. Todd (2005) ‘Does Matching Overcome LaLonde’s Critiques of Non-
experimental Estimators?’, Journal of  Econometrics 125: 305-53  
Swinnerton, K. and C.A. Rogers (1999) ‘The Economics of Child Labour: Comment’, 
American Economic Review 89.5: 1382-5 
Tabatabai, H. (2006) ‘Eliminating Child Labour: The Promise of Conditional Cash Transfers’, 
http://www.ciaris.org/workspace_files/153/cct_tabatabai_2006_eliminating_cl_promise_of_cct
s_final_061025_english.pdf (accessed 9 Dec 2008) 
Thomas, Duncan, Kathleen Beegle, Elizabeth Frankenberg, Bondan Sikoki, John Strauss 
and Graciela Teruel (2004) ‘Education in a Crisis’, Journal of  Development Economics 74.1: 
53–85 
Yap, Yoon-Tien, Guilherme Sedlace and Peter F. Orazem (2002) ‘Limiting Child Labour 
through Behavior-Based Income Transfers: An Experimental Evaluation of the PETI 
Programme in Rural Brazil’, http://grupobid.org/res/publications/pubfiles/pubS-223.pdf 
(accessed 9 Dec 2008) 
PRODUCTIVE SAFETY NET PROGRAMME AND CHILDREN’S TIME USE BETWEEN  
WORK AND SCHOOLING IN ETHIOPIA 
 38 
 Appendix A4 
 Descriptive statistics  
Table A4.1. Mean values of  variables at household level for rural and urban areas  
 Rural Urban Total 
Variables  mean mean mean 
Age of household head 43 41.9 42.7 
Sex of household head 0.813 0.672 0.756 
Mother’s educational level (Round 1) 0.723 3.44 1.821 
Father’s educational level (Round 1) 1.414 3.74 2.353 
Father’s education level (Round 2) 2.808 5.31 3.82 
Mother’s education level (Round 2) 1.334 4.28 2.524 
Distance to school 35.822 22.59 30.477 
Birth order 4.014 3.55 3.827 
Asset index for 8-year-olds (Round 1) 0.245 0.13 0.198 
Wealth index for 8-year-olds (Round 1) 0.084 0.32 0.179 
Asset index square (ai182) 0.067 0.03 0.052 
Wealth index square (wi182) 0.013 0.12 0.057 
Number of dependants in the household  1.459 0.93 1.246 
Number of 17-65 male fam. members   1.204 1.17 1.189 
Number of 17-65 female  fam. members   1.238 1.4 1.303 
Death or illness dummy (Round 2) 0.459 0.46 0.461 
Theft dummy (Round 2) 0.139 0.13 0.136 
Increase in input price dummy (Round 2) 0.377 0.19 0.302 
Increase in input price or decrease in output price dummy (Round 2) 0.399 0.2 0.32 
Death of livestock dummy (Round 2) 0.377 0.08 0.257 
Dummy for place employment shutdown or job lose (Round 2) 0.053 0.18 0.104 
Drought dummy (Round 2) 0.469 0.07 0.306 
Dummy for drought crop failure and pests and diseases (Round 2) 0.723 0.12 0.481 
Having to pay for school dummy (Round 2) 0.096 0.1 0.098 
New HH member or birth dummy (Round 2) 0.212 0.09 0.162 
Natural disaster including drought (Round 2) 0.651 0.1 0.43 
Death or illness dummy (Round 1) 0.265 0.34 0.294 
Theft dummy (Round 1) 0.12 0.07 0.101 
Death of livestock dummy (Round 1) 0.399 0.1 0.278 
Dummy for place employment shutdown or job lose (Round 1) 0.122 0.23 0.164 
Dummy for drought crop failure and pests and diseases (Round 1) 0.661 0.08 0.424 
Having to pay for school dummy (Round 1) 0.111 0.16 0.132 
New HH member or birth dummy (Round 1) 0.116 0.1 0.11 
Natural disaster including drought (Round 1) 0.396 0.05 0.256 
Dummy for Addis Ababa 0 0.36 0.146 
Dummy for Amhara 0.245 0.12 0.196 
Dummy for Oromia 0.247 0.14 0.204 
Dummy for SNNP 0.252 0.24 0.249 
Dummy for Tigray 0.257 0.13 0.205 
Urban dummy   0.4 
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Table A4.2. Percentage of  children who missed class and dropouts     
 Rural Urban Total  
Per cent of 12-year-old children who dropped out from school   3.04 2.03 2.30% 
Percentage of children who missed classes for more than one whole 
week in the last 12 months  
13.8 14.7 14.3 
Number of days missed in the last 12 months 6 4.4 5.3 
Time (in minutes)  it takes children to reach  school  35.8 22.6 30.5 
Table A4.3. Time of  the year (months) when children are most absent from school 
 Rural Urban Total 
September  2.9 1.92 2.48 
October 23.19 9.62 17.36 
November 24.64 23.08 23.97 
December 18.84 11.54 15.7 
January 13.04 17.31 14.88 
February 1.45 11.54 5.79 
March 5.8 3.85 4.96 
April 1.45 7.69 4.13 
May 5.8 7.69 6.61 
June 2.9 5.77 4.13 
Table A4.4. Reasons for missing schooling over the last 12 months    
 Rural Urban Total 
Need for domestic work and/or agricultural work at home 31.1 1.8 18.3 
Had to do paid work 46.0 73.7 58.0 
Others  reasons  23.0 24.6 23.7 
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 Appendix A5 
 Results of propensity score regression  
Table A5.1a. First stage logistic regression (propensity score) of  public work part of  the 
PSNP in rural areas and descriptive statics  















Coef. S.E z P>z Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
maxedur1 -0.075 0.048 -1.590 0.113 5.122 4.458 4.814 4.805 4.458 4.589 
ai18 8.702 8.537 1.020 0.308 0.268 0.218 0.245 0.256 0.218 0.233 
wi18 -32.514 10.859 -2.990 0.003 0.076 0.093 0.084 0.065 0.092 0.082 
ai182 -51.567 20.968 -2.460 0.014 0.076 0.056 0.067 0.070 0.056 0.061 
wi182 23.064 22.797 1.010 0.312 0.011 0.014 0.013 0.008 0.014 0.012 
asaw -16.212 26.867 -0.600 0.546 0.021 0.020 0.020 0.017 0.019 0.018 
depen 0.054 0.654 0.080 0.935 1.510 1.400 1.459 1.421 1.405 1.411 
wdepn 0.656 1.933 0.340 0.734 0.112 0.132 0.121 0.088 0.131 0.115 
asdepn -0.069 2.398 -0.030 0.977 0.417 0.326 0.375 0.377 0.326 0.345 
w7to17 5.388 2.385 2.260 0.024 0.140 0.172 0.155 0.115 0.172 0.151 
w17to65m 3.821 2.497 1.530 0.126 0.095 0.110 0.102 0.076 0.111 0.097 
w17to65f 3.950 3.946 1.000 0.317 0.091 0.121 0.105 0.081 0.120 0.105 
wdcropfr2 7.294 4.950 1.470 0.141 0.045 0.068 0.055 0.049 0.066 0.060 
wdcattler2 2.373 3.998 0.590 0.553 0.025 0.040 0.032 0.027 0.039 0.034 
wddillnesr2 -2.824 3.869 -0.730 0.465 0.032 0.038 0.035 0.033 0.036 0.035 
a7to17 -0.320 2.722 -0.120 0.906 0.513 0.405 0.463 0.468 0.410 0.432 
a17to65m 1.298 2.658 0.490 0.625 0.347 0.277 0.315 0.318 0.279 0.294 
a17to65f -0.266 3.971 -0.070 0.947 0.328 0.274 0.303 0.319 0.275 0.292 
adcattler2 4.823 4.136 1.170 0.244 0.101 0.095 0.098 0.104 0.094 0.097 
addillnesr2 2.200 3.644 0.600 0.546 0.130 0.097 0.114 0.132 0.097 0.110 
ch7to17 -0.273 0.730 -0.370 0.708 1.873 1.819 1.848 1.799 1.840 1.824 
nbn17_65mr1 -0.323 0.747 -0.430 0.665 1.223 1.181 1.204 1.164 1.195 1.183 
nbn17_65fr1 -0.055 1.141 -0.050 0.961 1.217 1.263 1.238 1.233 1.267 1.254 
dcropfr2 0.610 0.670 0.910 0.363 0.672 0.781 0.723 0.786 0.779 0.781 
ddillnesr2 -0.566 0.987 -0.570 0.567 0.481 0.433 0.459 0.516 0.431 0.463 
dtheftr2 0.505 0.384 1.310 0.189 0.137 0.141 0.139 0.157 0.141 0.147 
dinputpr2 0.691 0.984 0.700 0.483 0.446 0.296 0.377 0.447 0.305 0.359 
dpricer2 -0.491 0.967 -0.510 0.612 0.471 0.315 0.399 0.459 0.321 0.373 
dcattler2 -1.459 1.130 -1.290 0.197 0.357 0.400 0.377 0.384 0.397 0.392 
dnewhhr2 -0.239 0.330 -0.720 0.470 0.185 0.244 0.212 0.220 0.248 0.238 
dndisr2 -0.949 0.552 -1.720 0.086 0.631 0.674 0.651 0.736 0.672 0.696 
comm_7 0.291 0.629 0.460 0.643 0.080 0.078 0.079 0.138 0.076 0.100 
comm_8 0.490 0.647 0.760 0.449 0.099 0.067 0.084 0.164 0.061 0.100 
comm_9 2.432 0.699 3.480 0.001 0.022 0.159 0.086 0.044 0.164 0.119 
comm_10 0.051 0.635 0.080 0.935 0.108 0.056 0.084 0.145 0.057 0.090 
comm_18 -0.350 0.668 -0.520 0.600 0.121 0.041 0.084 0.157 0.042 0.086 
comm_19 -1.571 0.674 -2.330 0.020 0.134 0.026 0.084 0.126 0.027 0.064 
comm_20 2.884 0.723 3.990 0.000 0.029 0.148 0.084 0.057 0.145 0.112 
comm_21 3.149 0.789 3.990 0.000 0.013 0.170 0.086 0.025 0.172 0.116 
comm_23 4.002 0.884 4.530 0.000 0.019 0.163 0.086 0.031 0.160 0.112 
comm_24 -1.582 1.028 -1.540 0.124 0.025 0.007 0.017 0.013 0.008 0.010 
_cons 2.454 1.860 1.320 0.187             
Number of obs 484                   
LR chi2(41) 243.4                   
Prob > chi2 0.000                   
Pseudo R2 0.365                   
Log likelihood =  -212                   
See Table A5.5 below for description of variables abbreviated  
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Table A5.1b. Impact of  PSNP on child welfare whose parents participate in public work 
component of  PSNP  
  All     All     
Variable TTk S.E. T-stat ATTn S.E. T-stat 
work 0.325 0.207 1.570 0.968 0.436 2.220 
cnpaywrk 0.191 0.200 0.960 0.853 0.423 2.020 
cpaywork 0.134 0.070 1.920 0.115 0.121 0.950 
chcaredom -0.567 0.172 -3.300 -0.078 0.435 -0.180 
cpayunpaidw -0.269 0.199 -1.350 0.887 0.461 1.920 
cschool 0.146 0.163 0.900 -0.185 0.421 -0.440 
cstudy 0.133 0.089 1.490 -0.121 0.218 -0.550 
gradnow 0.249 0.166 1.500 -0.660 0.373 -1.770 
  girls           
work 0.400 0.254 1.570 -0.584 0.507 -1.150 
cnpaywrk 0.146 0.239 0.610 -0.541 0.481 -1.120 
cpaywork 0.254 0.092 2.760 -0.043 0.116 -0.370 
chcaredom -0.501 0.235 -2.140 0.473 0.600 0.790 
cpayunpaidw -0.115 0.271 -0.420 -0.112 0.625 -0.180 
cschool 0.250 0.230 1.090 0.293 0.558 0.520 
cstudy 0.255 0.123 2.070 -0.210 0.273 -0.770 
gradnow 0.184 0.233 0.790 -0.237 0.546 -0.430 
  boys           
work 0.194 0.284 0.680 1.251 0.512 2.450 
cnpaywrk 0.173 0.278 0.620 1.297 0.501 2.590 
cpaywork 0.021 0.105 0.200 -0.046 0.269 -0.170 
chcaredom -0.571 0.205 -2.780 -0.261 0.452 -0.580 
cpayunpaidw -0.416 0.290 -1.430 0.980 0.564 1.740 
cschool 0.056 0.231 0.240 -0.218 0.465 -0.470 
cstudy 0.020 0.129 0.160 -0.163 0.262 -0.620 
gradnow 0.323 0.233 1.390 -0.370 0.450 -0.820 
note: For two tail test and for n>120,  T values for 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance are 2.576, 1.96, and 1.645, respectively  
ATTk=average treatment effect of the treated using kernel matching  
ATTn=average treatment effect of the treated using nearest neighbourhood matching  
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Table A5.2a. First stage logistic regression (propensity score) for EGS in rural areas and 
descriptive statics  















Coef. S.E Z P>Z Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
ai18 -1.083 6.871 -0.160 0.875 0.255 0.228 0.245 0.250 0.228 0.241 
wi18 -5.122 8.574 -0.600 0.550 0.087 0.078 0.084 0.092 0.078 0.086 
ai182 -36.710 15.716 -2.340 0.020 0.071 0.060 0.067 0.069 0.060 0.065 
wi182 9.625 17.546 0.550 0.583 0.013 0.011 0.013 0.014 0.011 0.013 
asaw -5.825 19.190 -0.300 0.761 0.022 0.017 0.020 0.022 0.017 0.020 
depen -0.430 0.467 -0.920 0.358 1.541 1.324 1.459 1.456 1.324 1.401 
wdepn -2.489 1.648 -1.510 0.131 0.134 0.100 0.121 0.132 0.100 0.119 
asdepn 2.237 1.642 1.360 0.173 0.404 0.327 0.375 0.372 0.327 0.353 
w7to17 -0.195 1.648 -0.120 0.906 0.162 0.143 0.155 0.169 0.143 0.158 
w17to65m 3.144 1.919 1.640 0.101 0.107 0.095 0.102 0.112 0.095 0.105 
w17to65f 0.698 3.132 0.220 0.824 0.108 0.099 0.105 0.115 0.099 0.109 
wdcropfr2 0.887 3.457 0.260 0.798 0.057 0.052 0.055 0.060 0.052 0.057 
wdcattler2 -5.386 3.324 -1.620 0.105 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.031 0.032 0.032 
wddillnesr2 4.802 3.185 1.510 0.132 0.034 0.036 0.035 0.034 0.036 0.035 
a7to17 4.028 1.915 2.100 0.035 0.477 0.441 0.463 0.466 0.441 0.456 
a17to65m 1.938 1.824 1.060 0.288 0.325 0.297 0.315 0.316 0.297 0.308 
a17to65f -0.041 2.569 -0.020 0.987 0.313 0.286 0.303 0.312 0.286 0.301 
adcropfr2 1.268 2.865 0.440 0.658 0.186 0.174 0.182 0.181 0.174 0.178 
adcattler2 0.734 3.112 0.240 0.814 0.094 0.105 0.098 0.083 0.105 0.092 
addillnesr2 0.333 2.656 0.130 0.900 0.117 0.111 0.114 0.110 0.111 0.110 
ch7to17 -1.000 0.514 -1.950 0.052 1.843 1.856 1.848 1.848 1.856 1.851 
nbn17_65mr1 -0.493 0.512 -0.960 0.336 1.215 1.185 1.204 1.204 1.185 1.196 
nbn17_65fr1 -0.195 0.764 -0.250 0.799 1.235 1.243 1.238 1.256 1.243 1.250 
ddillnesr2 -0.366 0.738 -0.500 0.620 0.450 0.473 0.459 0.430 0.473 0.448 
dtheftr2 -0.218 0.342 -0.640 0.524 0.133 0.149 0.139 0.126 0.149 0.136 
dinputpr2 0.972 0.773 1.260 0.209 0.401 0.338 0.377 0.359 0.338 0.350 
dpricer2 -0.832 0.772 -1.080 0.281 0.425 0.356 0.399 0.379 0.356 0.369 
dcattler2 0.585 0.878 0.670 0.506 0.351 0.419 0.377 0.320 0.419 0.362 
dcropfr2 -0.111 0.846 -0.130 0.896 0.715 0.734 0.723 0.712 0.734 0.721 
dnewhhr2 0.065 0.291 0.220 0.822 0.210 0.216 0.212 0.201 0.216 0.207 
dndisr2 -0.844 0.460 -1.840 0.066 0.663 0.631 0.651 0.660 0.631 0.648 
comm_6 0.849 0.595 1.430 0.154 0.039 0.135 0.075 0.045 0.135 0.083 
comm_7 1.013 0.533 1.900 0.057 0.050 0.126 0.079 0.058 0.126 0.087 
comm_8 1.479 0.478 3.090 0.002 0.047 0.144 0.084 0.055 0.144 0.092 
comm_9 2.604 0.582 4.470 0.000 0.019 0.194 0.086 0.023 0.194 0.094 
comm_10 -1.219 0.586 -2.080 0.037 0.116 0.032 0.084 0.123 0.032 0.085 
comm_12 -1.108 0.628 -1.760 0.078 0.094 0.041 0.074 0.110 0.041 0.081 
comm_18 -1.096 0.594 -1.840 0.065 0.113 0.036 0.084 0.126 0.036 0.089 
comm_19 -0.951 0.592 -1.610 0.108 0.108 0.045 0.084 0.123 0.045 0.090 
comm_21 0.257 0.497 0.520 0.604 0.088 0.081 0.086 0.104 0.081 0.094 
comm_23 -0.431 0.572 -0.750 0.452 0.091 0.077 0.086 0.107 0.077 0.094 
comm_24 0.250 0.850 0.290 0.769 0.014 0.023 0.017 0.016 0.023 0.019 
_cons 2.717 1.628 1.670 0.095       
Number of obs 538          
LR chi2(42) 167.24          
Prob > chi2 0.000          
Pseudo R2 0.229          
Log likelihood =  -281.04          
For two tail test and for n>120,  T values for 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance are 2.576, 1.96, and  1.645 respectively; 
ATTk=average treatment effect of the treated using kernel matching  
ATTn=nearest neighborhood  
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Table A5.2b. Impact of  EGS on child welfare  
Variable ATTk S.E. T-stat ATTn S.E. T-stat 
All children (N=538)       
Paid and unpaid work outside home 0.309 0.200 1.540 0.497 0.339 1.470 
    Unpaid work outside home 0.043 0.192 0.230 0.287 0.328 0.870 
    Paid work outside home 0.266 0.078 3.400 0.210 0.113 1.860 
Child care and household chores  -0.310 0.160 -1.940 -0.250 0.285 -0.880 
Total work  -0.009 0.190 -0.050 0.247 0.326 0.760 
Schooling  -0.355 0.158 -2.250 -0.127 0.251 -0.500 
Studying  -0.018 0.086 -0.210 -0.286 0.153 -1.870 
Grade completed  0.042 0.160 0.260 -0.078 0.264 -0.300 
Girls (N=255)             
Paid and unpaid work outside home -0.004 0.254 -0.020 0.328 0.447 0.730 
    Unpaid work outside home -0.263 0.239 -1.100 0.066 0.428 0.150 
    Paid work outside home 0.259 0.115 2.250 0.263 0.139 1.900 
Child care and household chores  -0.149 0.224 -0.670 -0.726 0.405 -1.790 
Total work  -0.136 0.243 -0.560 -0.380 0.505 -0.750 
Schooling  -0.246 0.228 -1.080 -0.115 0.408 -0.280 
Studying  0.208 0.127 1.630 0.160 0.210 0.760 
Grade completed  0.198 0.232 0.850 -0.043 0.392 -0.110 
Boys (N=277)             
Paid and unpaid work outside home 0.055 0.269 0.210 0.255 0.404 0.630 
    Unpaid work outside home -0.120 0.261 -0.460 0.176 0.401 0.440 
    Paid work outside home 0.176 0.100 1.760 0.079 0.155 0.510 
Child care and household chores  -0.013 0.196 -0.070 0.043 0.297 0.140 
Total work  0.012 0.275 0.040 0.264 0.380 0.690 
Schooling  -0.360 0.221 -1.630 -0.172 0.308 -0.560 
Studying  -0.182 0.123 -1.480 -0.316 0.192 -1.650 
Grade completed  0.017 0.225 0.070 0.015 0.327 0.050 
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Table A5.3a. First stage logistic regression (propensity score) of  agricultural extension 
support programme for rural areas  
Before matching After matching Explanatory 
variable 













 Coef. S.E z P>z Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
maxedur1 0.15 0.06 2.64 0.008 4.778 4.980 4.814 4.851 4.980 4.889 
ai18 8.17 12.50 0.65 0.513 0.249 0.229 0.245 0.248 0.228 0.242 
wi18 -18.17 16.16 -1.12 0.261 0.077 0.116 0.084 0.082 0.115 0.092 
ai182 28.87 30.51 0.95 0.344 0.068 0.060 0.067 0.068 0.060 0.065 
wi182 -10.12 30.66 -0.33 0.741 0.011 0.018 0.013 0.012 0.017 0.014 
Asaw 36.65 33.62 1.09 0.276 0.019 0.027 0.020 0.020 0.026 0.022 
Depen 1.47 0.73 2 0.045 1.440 1.548 1.459 1.393 1.540 1.436 
Wdepn 0.12 2.74 0.04 0.966 0.109 0.179 0.121 0.107 0.174 0.127 
Asdepn -4.95 2.52 -1.96 0.05 0.377 0.364 0.375 0.358 0.359 0.359 
w7to17 -1.85 2.63 -0.7 0.482 0.141 0.217 0.155 0.155 0.217 0.173 
w17to65m 1.65 3.56 0.46 0.644 0.094 0.139 0.102 0.098 0.139 0.110 
w17to65f 2.80 4.78 0.59 0.557 0.094 0.153 0.105 0.104 0.151 0.118 
wdcropfr2 5.00 5.38 0.93 0.353 0.047 0.095 0.055 0.051 0.095 0.064 
wdcattler2 14.20 5.47 2.6 0.009 0.027 0.055 0.032 0.033 0.054 0.039 
wddillnesr2 2.89 5.34 0.54 0.589 0.032 0.050 0.035 0.029 0.046 0.034 
a7to17 -4.59 2.82 -1.63 0.104 0.471 0.425 0.463 0.475 0.426 0.460 
a17to65m -3.34 2.70 -1.24 0.215 0.324 0.269 0.315 0.305 0.271 0.295 
a17to65f 0.19 3.42 0.06 0.955 0.306 0.287 0.303 0.307 0.285 0.301 
adcropfr2 -5.28 5.39 -0.98 0.327 0.179 0.193 0.182 0.183 0.195 0.186 
adcattler2 1.41 4.55 0.31 0.757 0.097 0.101 0.098 0.097 0.099 0.098 
addillnesr2 -4.13 4.73 -0.87 0.382 0.117 0.102 0.114 0.104 0.098 0.102 
ch7to17 1.31 0.80 1.63 0.103 1.842 1.875 1.848 1.872 1.890 1.877 
nbn17_65mr1 0.09 0.77 0.12 0.906 1.213 1.163 1.204 1.161 1.180 1.167 
nbn17_65fr1 -0.31 1.07 -0.29 0.769 1.227 1.288 1.238 1.227 1.290 1.246 
ddillnesr2 0.92 1.33 0.69 0.489 0.465 0.433 0.459 0.426 0.420 0.424 
dtheftr2 0.33 0.56 0.59 0.558 0.148 0.096 0.139 0.116 0.100 0.111 
dinputpr2 -2.03 0.93 -2.17 0.03 0.415 0.202 0.377 0.368 0.200 0.319 
dpricer2 1.46 0.92 1.59 0.113 0.433 0.240 0.399 0.393 0.240 0.348 
dcattler2 -1.55 1.36 -1.14 0.256 0.367 0.423 0.377 0.372 0.420 0.386 
dcropfr2 1.36 1.56 0.87 0.384 0.698 0.837 0.723 0.711 0.850 0.751 
dnewhhr2 -0.56 0.45 -1.26 0.207 0.206 0.240 0.212 0.190 0.240 0.205 
dndisr2 0.56 0.69 0.81 0.419 0.627 0.760 0.651 0.661 0.770 0.693 
comm_7 -1.15 1.40 -0.82 0.412 0.090 0.029 0.079 0.149 0.030 0.114 
comm_8 -2.62 1.61 -1.62 0.105 0.100 0.010 0.084 0.087 0.010 0.064 
comm_9 -2.88 1.68 -1.72 0.086 0.102 0.010 0.086 0.045 0.010 0.035 
comm_10 -1.07 1.41 -0.76 0.447 0.096 0.029 0.084 0.165 0.030 0.126 
comm_12 -0.64 1.49 -0.43 0.665 0.083 0.029 0.074 0.112 0.020 0.085 
comm_19 0.40 1.33 0.3 0.766 0.081 0.096 0.084 0.161 0.100 0.143 
comm_20 2.51 1.31 1.92 0.055 0.035 0.308 0.084 0.062 0.310 0.135 
comm_21 1.85 1.32 1.41 0.16 0.048 0.260 0.086 0.091 0.270 0.143 
comm_23 2.36 1.33 1.77 0.077 0.056 0.221 0.086 0.103 0.210 0.135 
_cons -5.82 2.72 -2.13 0.033       
Number of obs 426          
LR chi2(41) 188.42          
Prob > chi2 0.000          
Pseudo R2 0.4058          
Log likelihood =  -137.935          
See Table A5.5 below for the description of variables abbreviated  
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Table A5.3b. Impact of  agricultural extension programme  
Outcome Kernel matching Nearest neighbourhood method 
 Att S.E. T-stat Att S.E. T-stat 
All children       
work -0.294 0.245 -1.200 -0.635 0.431 -1.470 
cnpaywrk -0.056 0.242 -0.230 -0.379 0.428 -0.880 
cpaywork -0.238 0.053 -4.480 -0.257 0.099 -2.600 
chcaredom -0.190 0.195 -0.980 0.614 0.328 1.870 
cpayunpaidw -0.503 0.218 -2.310 -0.067 0.403 -0.170 
cschool 0.717 0.180 3.970 0.432 0.335 1.290 
cstudy 0.202 0.111 1.810 -0.027 0.195 -0.140 
gradnow 0.314 0.200 1.570 0.007 0.364 0.020 
Girls             
work -0.186 0.276 -0.670 -0.415 0.594 -0.700 
cnpaywrk 0.078 0.266 0.290 -0.141 0.572 -0.250 
cpaywork -0.264 0.079 -3.320 -0.274 0.091 -3.030 
chcaredom -0.418 0.224 -1.860 0.685 0.536 1.280 
cpayunpaidw -0.614 0.285 -2.150 0.262 0.638 0.410 
cschool 0.927 0.217 4.270 0.297 0.566 0.530 
cstudy 0.134 0.138 0.970 -0.340 0.334 -1.020 
gradnow 0.534 0.241 2.220 -0.011 0.589 -0.020 
Boys             
work 0.317 0.363 0.870 -0.049 0.545 -0.090 
cnpaywrk 0.535 0.361 1.480 0.195 0.553 0.350 
cpaywork -0.218 0.072 -3.040 -0.243 0.163 -1.500 
chcaredom -0.618 0.290 -2.130 0.135 0.398 0.340 
cpayunpaidw -0.326 0.334 -0.980 0.006 0.546 0.010 
cschool 0.321 0.319 1.000 0.350 0.481 0.730 
cstudy 0.290 0.196 1.480 0.170 0.282 0.600 
gradnow -0.095 0.346 -0.270 -0.081 0.494 -0.160 
 
PRODUCTIVE SAFETY NET PROGRAMME AND CHILDREN’S TIME USE BETWEEN  
WORK AND SCHOOLING IN ETHIOPIA 
 46 
Table A5.4. First stage logistic regression (propensity score) of  direct support (part of  the 
PSNP) for rural and urban areas  
Before matching After matching 
Untreated Treated All Untreated Treated All 
First stage logistic regression of 
dummy for receiving direct 
support N=719 N=236 N=955 N=693 N=236 N=929 
Explanatory 
variables  
Coef. S. E Z P>z Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
maxedur1 -0.027 0.031 -0.880 0.380 6.143 6.386 6.203 6.150 6.386 6.210 
ai18 5.622 4.139 1.360 0.174 0.205 0.177 0.198 0.202 0.176 0.195 
wi18 0.529 3.338 0.160 0.874 0.176 0.188 0.179 0.179 0.190 0.181 
ai182 -26.180 11.436 -2.290 0.022 0.054 0.044 0.052 0.053 0.044 0.051 
wi182 -3.424 3.929 -0.870 0.383 0.055 0.062 0.057 0.057 0.062 0.058 
asaw 8.629 6.818 1.270 0.206 0.031 0.028 0.030 0.031 0.028 0.030 
depen 0.269 0.270 1.000 0.318 1.270 1.172 1.246 1.255 1.165 1.233 
wdepn -0.906 0.641 -1.410 0.157 0.195 0.178 0.191 0.196 0.180 0.192 
asdepn -0.627 0.958 -0.650 0.513 0.291 0.243 0.279 0.283 0.240 0.272 
w7to17 1.495 0.752 1.990 0.047 0.319 0.356 0.328 0.325 0.360 0.334 
w17to65m 0.100 0.602 0.170 0.868 0.227 0.219 0.225 0.232 0.222 0.229 
w17to65f -1.768 0.947 -1.870 0.062 0.244 0.259 0.248 0.247 0.262 0.251 
wdcropfr2 -2.913 2.008 -1.450 0.147 0.048 0.038 0.046 0.045 0.038 0.043 
wdcattler2 -2.674 2.010 -1.330 0.183 0.032 0.016 0.028 0.031 0.016 0.027 
wddillnesr2 2.353 1.209 1.950 0.052 0.071 0.113 0.081 0.071 0.114 0.082 
a7to17 0.412 1.007 0.410 0.683 0.391 0.325 0.375 0.389 0.324 0.373 
a17to65m 0.377 0.970 0.390 0.697 0.266 0.214 0.253 0.263 0.215 0.251 
a17to65f -1.326 1.486 -0.890 0.372 0.263 0.232 0.255 0.259 0.232 0.252 
adcattler2 1.003 2.593 0.390 0.699 0.069 0.044 0.063 0.067 0.042 0.061 
addillnesr2 -2.578 1.732 -1.490 0.137 0.094 0.093 0.094 0.094 0.094 0.094 
ch7to17 -0.307 0.296 -1.040 0.301 1.864 1.812 1.851 1.882 1.818 1.865 
nbn17_65mr1 -0.054 0.275 -0.200 0.845 1.216 1.105 1.189 1.229 1.110 1.199 
nbn17_65fr1 0.672 0.419 1.600 0.109 1.296 1.326 1.303 1.300 1.331 1.308 
dcropfr2 0.936 0.488 1.920 0.055 0.491 0.448 0.481 0.479 0.441 0.469 
ddillnesr2 0.634 0.480 1.320 0.186 0.433 0.548 0.461 0.436 0.555 0.466 
dtheftr2 -0.291 0.281 -1.030 0.301 0.142 0.117 0.136 0.144 0.110 0.136 
dinputpr2 -1.149 0.639 -1.800 0.072 0.302 0.301 0.302 0.313 0.305 0.311 
dpricer2 1.007 0.632 1.590 0.111 0.316 0.335 0.320 0.328 0.335 0.329 
dcattler2 -0.232 0.728 -0.320 0.750 0.281 0.184 0.257 0.274 0.178 0.250 
dnewhhr2 -0.286 0.277 -1.030 0.301 0.174 0.126 0.162 0.160 0.127 0.152 
dndisr2 -0.620 0.405 -1.530 0.126 0.447 0.377 0.430 0.433 0.369 0.417 
demplr2 0.298 0.275 1.080 0.279 0.085 0.163 0.104 0.087 0.165 0.107 
dedupr2 0.466 0.296 1.570 0.116 0.090 0.121 0.098 0.097 0.123 0.103 
comm_2 -1.688 0.535 -3.150 0.002 0.058 0.025 0.050 0.061 0.025 0.052 
comm_3 -1.707 0.852 -2.000 0.045 0.019 0.008 0.016 0.020 0.008 0.017 
comm_4 -0.706 0.578 -1.220 0.222 0.031 0.029 0.031 0.033 0.030 0.032 
comm_5 0.839 0.414 2.030 0.043 0.028 0.117 0.050 0.029 0.119 0.052 
comm_7 -0.955 0.557 -1.720 0.086 0.054 0.025 0.047 0.058 0.021 0.048 
comm_8 -0.177 0.479 -0.370 0.712 0.051 0.046 0.050 0.052 0.038 0.048 
comm_9 -1.473 0.599 -2.460 0.014 0.062 0.017 0.051 0.066 0.017 0.054 
comm_10 1.750 0.436 4.010 0.000 0.030 0.113 0.050 0.032 0.114 0.053 
comm_11 0.658 0.452 1.460 0.145 0.038 0.088 0.050 0.040 0.089 0.053 
comm_12 -2.208 1.056 -2.090 0.037 0.057 0.004 0.044 0.045 0.004 0.034 
comm_13 0.124 0.451 0.270 0.783 0.047 0.046 0.047 0.051 0.047 0.050 
comm_14 -1.867 0.567 -3.290 0.001 0.059 0.021 0.050 0.062 0.021 0.052 
comm_15 -1.474 0.606 -2.430 0.015 0.039 0.021 0.035 0.040 0.021 0.036 
comm_16 -0.064 1.243 -0.050 0.959 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
comm_17 -0.774 0.924 -0.840 0.402 0.011 0.008 0.010 0.012 0.008 0.011 
comm_18 0.987 0.430 2.290 0.022 0.043 0.071 0.050 0.046 0.072 0.053 
comm_20 -2.691 1.064 -2.530 0.011 0.065 0.004 0.050 0.036 0.004 0.028 
comm_21 -1.945 0.677 -2.870 0.004 0.063 0.013 0.051 0.066 0.013 0.053 
comm_22 1.194 0.454 2.630 0.009 0.034 0.096 0.049 0.032 0.097 0.048 
comm_23 -1.102 0.539 -2.050 0.041 0.059 0.025 0.051 0.059 0.025 0.051 
comm_24 -1.174 0.795 -1.480 0.140 0.027 0.008 0.022 0.027 0.008 0.023 
_cons -1.150 0.867 -1.330 0.185             
No. of  obs  955                   
LR chi2(54) 234.8                   
Prob > chi2 0.000                   
Pseudo R2 0.220                   
Log likelihood  -416.6                   
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Table A5.5. Description of  variables used in Table A5.1 to A5.5  
Variable name Description 
maxedur1 Maximum years of schooling in the household  
border Birth order in ascending order 
dmale Dummy for boys (1 if boy and 0 if girl) 
ai18 Asset index for 8-year-olds (Round 1) 
wi18 Wealth index for 8-year-olds (Round 1) 
depen Number of family members below 7 and above 65 years old  
ch7to17 Number of children between the age of 7 and 17 years 
nbn17_65mr1 Number of male family members >17 and less than 65 years 
nbn17_65fr1 Number of female family members >17 and less than 65 years 
ddillnesr2 Dummy for death or illness since 2002   
dtheftr2 Dummy for being attacked by theft since 2002 
dinputpr2 Dummy for  increase in input price since 2002 
dpricer2 Dummy for increase in input price since 2002 
dcattler2 Dummy for death of  owned livestock since 2002 
dcropfr2 Dummy for drought crop failure and pests and diseases since 2002 
dnewhhr2 Dummy for addition of new household member or birth since 2002 
dndisr2 Dummy for natural disaster including drought since 2002 
 Square and interaction variables 
ai182 square of ai18 
wi182 square of wi18 
Asaw ai18 X wi18 
Wdepn wi18  X  depn 
Asdepn as18  X  depen 
w7to17 wi18  X  ch7to17 
w17to65m wi18  X  nbn17_65mr1 
w17to65f wi18  X  nbn17_65fr1 
wdcropfr2 wi18  X  dcropfr2 
wdcattler2 wi18  X  dcattler2 
wddillnesr2 wi18  X  ddillnesr2 
a7to17 ai182  X  ch7to17 
a17to65m ai182  X  nbn17_65mr1 
a17to65f ai182  X  nbn17_65fr1 
adcropfr2 ai182  X  dcropfr2 
adcattler2 ai182  X  dcattler2 
addillnesr2 ai182  X  ddillnesr2 
Comm._1 to Comm_24  Community dummies  
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